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
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Political life in metropolitan
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The Royal Commission
on
Metropolitan Toronto

**Political Life in
Metropolitan Toronto :
A Survey of
Municipal Councillors**



Staff Study

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Political Life in Metropolitan Toronto:
A Survey of Municipal Councillors

This study was conducted and the report prepared by M. J. Powell with the assistance of Kenneth D. Cameron, Sharon Cohen, and Whipple Steinkrauss, who are members of the staff of The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto.


Any interpretations or conclusions contained herein do not necessarily represent findings of the Commission.

April, 1976


Acknowledgements

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INTRODUCTION

This report is based on a survey of municipal politicians conducted by The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto. It deals with various aspects of serving in local public office, including working conditions and how the politicians perceive their job. The report also considers other relevant issues such as election finances and the occupational backgrounds of municipal councillors.

The Commission's interest in these subjects emerged from concerns raised in several of the background reports prepared for the Commission and in briefs presented during the public hearings. Both the study of local government organization* and the study of the electoral system** raised questions about the manageability of local political duties. In particular, they questioned the feasibility of continuing to combine local and Metro responsibilities, and asked whether the burdens have become too onerous for one person to bear both. The local government organization study also mentioned the problems posed by local and Metro boards, which are responsible to councils but not directly controlled by them. In the electoral study, questions were raised about whether workload, remuneration, and job security considerations have a significant effect on who can run for public office and therefore restrict a council's potential to be fully representative of its community.

Several briefs to the Commission suggested that local politicians are not given the resources they need to do their job well; they argued that inadequate office facilities and insufficient secretarial and research assistance hamper the municipal councillor's efforts. Other briefs raised the issue of combining municipal duties and private work, and argued that local political office involves so much work that it must be considered a full-time job and paid accordingly.

Although these questions were raised, there is a dearth of information for answering them. There has been relatively little research done on this aspect of local government. Much of the available information is based on general impressions gathered through observation of the local political scene, informal conversations with politicians, etc., and there is no way of assessing its accuracy.

*The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, The Organization of Local Government in Metropolitan Toronto, Toronto, The Commission, 1975

**The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, The Electoral System for Metropolitan Toronto, Toronto, The Commission, 1975

The Commission recognized the importance of these issues and the need for reliable and accurate information about them. In many ways, the problems involved are a reflection on local political structures, and they should be examined when the present system is being evaluated and possible changes considered. 'Workability' is one of the important elements in successful local government organization. To consider this dimension, the Commission required some knowledge of how well existing structures serve those involved in making them work. Like the background reports and the briefs presented during the public hearings, this study is designed to provide additional information.

Although the Commission considers an examination of the issue important, it is well aware that no single survey or other study can provide answers to the many questions of local government organization in Metropolitan Toronto. Some of the problems the study raises could be solved in many ways, but in other cases there are no apparent solutions to difficult situations. Moreover, not all of the problems discussed in this report fall within the Commission's terms of reference.

It is also important to note that this study raises issues from only one perspective. Other considerations such as an appropriate and efficient method of delivering services, suitable structures for the management of growth, the role of citizen participation, Metro's financial position, the need for simplicity in the electoral system, and several more must be taken into account when the Commission makes its recommendations.

METHODOLOGY

In collecting information, the Commission chose to conduct interviews rather than to send out questionnaires, primarily to avoid the problem of a low response rate, which is common in self-administered questionnaires. Given the relatively small size of the total population (94), we decided to try to interview all of the councillors, instead of interviewing a sample and then using the techniques of statistical inference to describe the total population.

All the interviews were based on a standard questionnaire*, which was discussed with several former politicians before the survey and revised on the basis of their comments. Four people conducted the interviews; the list of municipal politicians was divided among them.

*Copies of the questionnaire are available from the Commission on request.

The Commission's objectives in data collection were not fully realized. Of the 94 potential respondents, only 87 actually participated in the interviews. The seven missing cases were all from the City of Toronto. One alderman was seriously ill and the other six, all members of the Reform Caucus*, refused to participate. Apart from this, the survey was very well received. Its success is, to a great extent, due to the excellent co-operation given the Commission by the 87 municipal politicians who did participate.

Survey information was analyzed in two ways. The quantifiable data (hours worked, election expenses, etc.) were coded, punched, and analyzed by computer using the Statistical Package for the Social Services (SPSS) Version 6. Non-quantifiable data (e.g. comments and recommendations) were taken directly from the questionnaires. Although in some cases figures are provided to show the distribution of opinions among politicians, most of this information is summarized in the text, with quotations from the interviews used to illustrate the main points.

NOTES ON THE DATA

The study is based on the responses from 87 municipal politicians, 14 females and 73 males. Included in this group are all 6 mayors, all 18 controllers and executive aldermen, and 63 of the 70 aldermen in the municipalities of Metropolitan Toronto. The distribution of respondents by municipality is as follows:

Toronto	16	(out of a possible 23)
East York	9	
Etobicoke	15	
North York	19	
Scarborough	17	
York	11	
TOTAL	87	(out of a possible 94)

Thirty-four (34) of the 37 Metro councillors** are included in the study. The remaining three are members of the Reform Caucus who, as mentioned, refused to participate in the survey.

*Interviews were conducted in December 1975 and January, 1976, before Alderman Dorothy Thomas resigned from the Reform Caucus.
**The Metro Chairman was not considered part of the study group because he is not chosen by public election. Mr. Godfrey was therefore not asked to participate in the survey.

In reading the tables in the following sections of the report, there are four points to be noted.

1) Because their responsibilities are similar, controllers and executive aldermen have usually been grouped together. The important exceptions are the discussions of time spent with constituents and campaign spending, where the difference in method of election was expected to produce differences between controllers and executive aldermen.

2) The sum of possible responses for all municipal politicians is N=87 and for Metro councillors N=34. Where the response rate is lower (e.g. N=81 or N=30) the missing cases are usually those who could not or did not give an answer to the question at hand. However, in some instances, there is another explanation and it is specified.

3) All respondents were assured of confidentiality and anonymity. To keep this agreement, we have combined categories or left out information wherever particular individuals could have been identified.

4) All the figures given in the following tables refer to the calendar year 1975, the most recent year for which our respondents could supply complete information. The only exceptions are campaign costs and campaign contributions, which both refer to the most recent municipal election (i.e., December, 1974), and figures on constituency size, which are based on the October 1974 assessment data.

INTERPRETING THE RESULTS

Several caveats should be mentioned at the outset, even though they will be repeated in the text. Various problems with the data occur in survey research projects. For example, even with careful phrasing of the questions, different respondents interpret identical questions differently. Other problems arise when, as in this project, the questions involve the respondents' recollections. The two most important of these are (a) the possibility of systematic bias, and (b) the problem of unrealistic precision in summary statistics.

When people give answers based on their recollection of events, it is inevitable that their answers are not exactly accurate. Usually some underestimate and others overestimate, and the variations even out. However, there is sometimes the problem of systematic bias. For example, in voter research when voters are asked how they voted in past elections, it is not uncommon for a greater number to recall voting for the winner than the election results bear out: people like to identify with the winning side. In this project, systematic bias might occur in answers on number of hours worked, election expenses, or other subjects where recollection is involved. There might have been a tendency, for example, for respondents

to underestimate campaign costs in view of current public concern about the level of campaign spending. However, each respondent was assured of confidentiality and anonymity, and we were impressed by their candour and by their efforts to provide us with detailed and exact information. While we cannot discount the possibility of systematic bias, we do not regard it as a serious problem. In any case, there is no inexpensive and manageable way of overcoming the problem.

The second difficulty is that, even disregarding systematic bias, there is a certain (unknown) degree of inaccuracy in our respondents' recollections of the length of their work week, etc. As mentioned above, the variations usually even out. Nevertheless, the weaknesses in the raw information are necessarily incorporated in the averages, cross-tabulations, and other methods of displaying the data. Thus, while we provide figures on the average work week that appear to be very precise, these figures can be no more exact than the information that went into them. This is an imperfection that we can do little more than acknowledge. There is no easy way of eliminating it. Even accepting this limitation of the data, we believe our results are a significant improvement over the casual estimates that, until now, have been the main source of information about local political life.

PART ONE: POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE

Before we begin the examination of what municipal councillors do, we can offer some information on their political backgrounds. Our respondents answered questions on how long they have held their present council jobs, what other publicly-elected positions they have held, and the total length of their service in public office. Using this information, we can make some preliminary comments on political career patterns in Metropolitan Toronto.

One of the subjects of interest in local politics is what can be termed recruitment; i.e., how municipal politicians enter public life. For a proper examination of this subject, we would require information about their community involvement before running for office, what prompted them to run, how many attempts they made before they were elected, and other questions we considered beyond the scope of our study. However, we can make some comments about the local politician's point of entry to municipal politics. Table 1.1* below shows how many politicians entered local public life through their present position, and how many had served in other elected positions first.

PRESENT POSITION	NO PREVIOUS POSITIONS	OTHER POSITIONS	TOTAL
Mayor	1	5	6
Controller/Executive Alderman	3	15	18
Alderman	48	15	63
TOTAL	52	35	87

TABLE 1.1 PREVIOUS ELECTED POSITIONS, BY COUNCIL POSITION (TOTAL)

Most aldermen (48, or 76.2%) have never held another elected position; their present jobs were their starting points in elected municipal politics. Among mayors and controllers or executive aldermen, it is more common for incumbents to have been elected to other positions before serving in their present capacity. This follows the expected pattern, for many people

*The seven aldermen from Toronto who were not included in the survey would probably produce variations in the figures we provide. These missing cases mean that figures are complete for all council positions except aldermen and for all municipalities except Toronto.

regard the executive positions as requiring prior council experience*. In fact, two of the politicians in the survey thought prior experience should be mandatory. One person argued that serving as a alderman should be a pre-requisite for all candidates for mayor or controller. The other councillor went further and suggested that this requirement should also apply to those running in provincial and federal elections.

Among those who have held other elected positions, the majority have served in only one other capacity. However, ten municipal politicians have previous experience in two or more elected offices. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 give the breakdowns.

PRESENT POSITION	TYPE OF OTHER POSITION				
	Controller	Alderman	Councillor**	Trustee	Other [†]
Mayor (N=3)	1	2	-	-	-
Controller/Executive Alderman (N=10)	-	9	-	1	-
Alderman (N=12)	1	-	3	7	1

TABLE 1.2 NATURE OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE AMONG THOSE HAVING HELD ONE OTHER POSITION^{††}

This table shows that for controllers the most common pattern is to be an alderman before becoming controller. It is misleading to refer to a pattern of previous experience among aldermen because, as Table 1.1 indicated, most of them have not held any other elective office. However, among aldermen who do have a public office background, the most common experience is as a school board trustee.

*In Toronto, the council has the power to ensure prior experience because it chooses the executive aldermen.

**'Councillor' refers to the aldermanic position in any of the small municipalities that were eliminated in the 1967 municipal consolidations.

[†]M.P., M.P.P., or elected member of Hydro/Public Utilities Commission

^{††}In all but one case, the other position was the politician's point of entry to local office. The exception is a person whose service in his present position was interrupted when he won election to another position.

PRESENT POSITION	TYPE OF OTHER POSITIONS*					
	Mayor/ Reeve	Controller/ Deputy Reeve	Alder- man	Coun- cillor**	Trustee	Other ⁺
Mayor (N=2)	-	1	2	1	-	-
Controller/Execu- tive Alderman (N=5)	1	-	5	1	3	2
Alderman (N=3)	2	2	1 ⁺⁺	2	2	-

TABLE 1.3 NATURE OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE AMONG THOSE HAVING HELD TWO OR MORE OTHER POSITIONS

The ten politicians represented in this table have held twenty-five positions among them. The most common position was 'alderman', which was held by eight of the ten politicians who have served in two or more offices. Five of the ten have also served as school board trustees.

From the figures given in these three tables, we can see that most aldermen begin their municipal service without having held other elective office. Among those who do have experience, most have served either on school boards or on the councils of villages and towns that were absorbed by the present area municipalities. For controllers and mayors, the most common pattern is to serve as alderman before being elected to an executive position. However, taking all council positions together, there appears to be a certain measure of flexibility. Among those included in our survey, there is no evidence that a 'public' apprenticeship is required for a successful municipal campaign. Even for those in executive positions, where prior experience is the rule rather than the exception, it is clear that previous elected experience is not essential to success.

*The rows do not add to the numbers given in the first column because each politician has served in at least two of the other listed positions.

**'Councillor' refers to the aldermanic position in any of the small municipalities that were eliminated in the 1967 municipal consolidations.

⁺M.P., M.P.P., or elected member of Hydro/Public Utilities Commission.

⁺⁺Refers to aldermanic service in another municipality outside Metropolitan Toronto.

Our information on previous elected positions tells something about the common routes to political office and about the breadth of experience among municipal politicians, but it does not deal with the politicians' experience in their present positions. Table 1.4 gives the breakdown of newcomers and incumbents, using the 1974 election as the dividing line.

PRESENT POSITION	NEWCOMERS (elected in 1974)	INCUMBENTS (elected in 1972 or earlier)	TOTAL
Mayor	-	6	6
Controller/Executive Alderman*	4	14	18
Alderman	14	49	63
TOTAL	18	69	87

TABLE 1.4 DISTRIBUTION OF NEWCOMERS AND INCUMBENTS, BY COUNCIL POSITION**

A total of 69 municipal politicians (79.3%) have at least one term's experience in their present position. The remaining 18 are newcomers. It is worth noting that all of the mayors are incumbents. For controllers and aldermen, 77.8% of those now in office were incumbents who won re-election to their present position. This supports the idea that the 1974 elections did not mark a major change in political direction in the municipalities of Metropolitan Toronto. But there is quite a sharp contrast between the 1972 and 1974 elections. After the 1972 elections, at least 32 councillors assumed new municipal duties or entered council positions for the first time***. (This number will increase according to the number of 1972 newcomers who did not run or were defeated in 1974, and were therefore not included in the survey).

*Although executive aldermen are not publicly elected to their executive position, we have treated them as though they were for the purposes of this table.

**Among newcomers, four (22.2%) have held positions other than those in which they now serve. Thirty-one incumbents (44.9%) have also held other elected positions.

***Partly because of the relatively high number of incumbents who won re-election in 1974, the figures on election spending given later in the report may be substantially lower than the corresponding 1972 costs.

The distribution of newcomers and incumbents among area municipalities is given in Table 1.5.

MUNICIPALITY	NEWCOMERS	INCUMBENTS	TOTAL
Toronto	2	14	16
East York	3	6	9
Etobicoke	1	14	15
North York	5	14	19
Scarborough	4	13	17
York	3	8	11
TOTAL	18	69	87

TABLE 1.5 DISTRIBUTION OF NEWCOMERS AND INCUMBENTS, BY MUNICIPALITY

These figures show us the turnover in the 1974 elections, arising either out of voter dissatisfaction (i.e., previous incumbents defeated) or out of the politician's own choice (i.e., those retiring or deciding not to run for other reasons). In each municipality, the change involved fewer than two-fifths of the councillors, ranging from a low of 6.7% in Etobicoke to a high of 33.3% in East York. We might assume that low turnover figures represent the normal attrition among municipal politicians. However, it is also possible for a major change of direction to come about, even if only a few of the councillors are replaced. This would occur when the few had special symbolic importance as the leaders of a particular movement in local politics.

If we examine the length of service in present positions, we can make some speculative comments about political continuity in the area municipalities. There are obvious limits to our ability to make assumptions on the basis of the politician's years in office; for example, gradual changes in attitude among incumbents and the cumulative effects of turnover in each election will affect the council's approach to local business. However, the average length of service among municipal politicians does tell us about political continuity, to the extent that it represents a working relationship between council and staff, and continuity or gradual change in municipal policy. In Table 1.6, we give the average number of years in office for councillors in the area municipalities.

MUNICIPALITY	AVERAGE NO. YEARS IN PRESENT POSITION (1974 incumbents only)	AVERAGE NO. YEARS IN PRESENT POSITION (all councillors)
Toronto	4.4 (N=14)	3.9 (N=16)
East York	7.0 (N=6)	5.0 (N=9)
Etobicoke	6.1 (N=14)	5.8 (N=15)
North York	3.6 (N=14)	2.9 (N=19)
Scarborough	6.6 (N=13)	5.3 (N=17)
York	6.4 (N=8)	4.9 (N=11)
TOTAL	5.5 (N=69)	4.5 (N=87)

TABLE 1.6 AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS IN PRESENT COUNCIL POSITION,
BY MUNICIPALITY

The first column shows the average experience in office among incumbents only, and the second column adjusts the figures so that newcomers are taken into account as well. The pattern in both suggests that there has been greater continuity in four boroughs: East York, Etobicoke, Scarborough, and York, where the incumbents have served in office for six or seven years, on average, and where the councils as a whole have roughly five years' experience. Toronto and North York councillors have on average less experience in their present jobs. Although we can note, for instance, that Etobicoke councillors have served twice as long as their North York counterparts (on average), we must be wary of making assumptions about the individual effects of such differences. However, if there are dramatic differences in the proportion of newcomers, it is reasonable to assume that the council with a much higher proportion will take longer to settle into a satisfactory working pattern, because the newcomers will have to familiarize themselves with staff organization and council procedures.

Nevertheless, we can suggest that differences in experience may reflect differences in political continuity. From this point of view, the figures imply that a major change in political direction has occurred more recently in Toronto and North York than in the other municipalities. This suggestion is valid as long as we assume that the entry of a substantial number of newcomers marks a major change in direction. Among the other municipalities, the figures suggest either greater stability in the past few years or a more gradual shift in direction.

However, we must be careful not to over-interpret these figures. They are municipal averages, and deal only with councillors' service in their present positions. There is also movement from one position to the other. Total length of service (i.e., experience in all locally-elected positions) can be introduced to qualify the figures relating to present position. Municipal averages for this new variable are given in Table 1.7

MUNICIPALITY	AVERAGE LENGTH OF SERVICE IN ALL LOCAL POSITIONS
Toronto	6.6 years
East York	8.9
Etobicoke	9.5
North York	4.5
Scarborough	6.9
York	9.8
OVER ALL	7.3 years

TABLE 1.7 AVERAGE LENGTH OF SERVICE IN ALL LOCAL POSITIONS,
BY MUNICIPALITY*

The pattern here is slightly different. We can group the municipalities together and suggest a similarity among East York, Etobicoke, and York, where politicians have an average experience of about 9 years in various local positions. Councillors in Toronto and Scarborough come next, with just under seven years' experience, and then North York politicians, whose average length of service is 4 1/2 years.

Again, we have to be wary of attributing too much to these figures, but it seems fair to say that political longevity (if we can use the word) is greatest in the three smallest boroughs. Perhaps this is a measure of voter satisfaction with the political direction of the municipality. But other interpretations are convincing too. It is possible that these municipalities have faced fewer divisive issues and that, in the absence of many difficult choices, voters have decided to vote in favour of the incumbents. On the other hand, if the workload in these three boroughs is more manageable than in the others, it may be more common for councillors to continue to seek re-election. To some extent, these

*Figures are based on service in local elective office, including council, school board, and Hydro/Public Utilities Commission. Figures for service as M.P. or M.P.P. have been excluded.

figures may reflect changing generations of political office-holders; perhaps many politicians in North York, Scarborough and Toronto reached retirement age at the end of the 1960's, or chose to retire at an earlier age.

Obviously, there are many possible interpretations of these figures, and of the others given in this section on political background. We have suggested some of the more obvious inferences that might be drawn, and have provided the relevant figures. Although political experience may be a significant factor in the way municipal councillors approach their jobs, its effects are difficult to gauge in a study of this sort. As we suggest later in the report, individual variations are very important and to determine the overall significance of political experience, we would have to study the same individuals over time, as their political experience changes. However, we have tried here to provide some background information about the local politicians who are the focus of this study.

PART TWO: HOW THE LOCAL POLITICIAN SPENDS HIS TIME

One of our main reasons for undertaking this study was to find out how much time is required for municipal politicians to carry out their duties and how that time is divided among various aspects of their job. Before we discuss our findings, we must emphasize that the data are *not* the result of impartial monitoring of the politicians' behaviour over a period of months, but are the politicians' own perceptions and recollections of the time they spend on their work. Although our respondents made an effort to give us careful and considered answers, it is only reasonable to assume that not all their recollections are accurate. But, since we cannot estimate how inaccurate they might be, the only practical approach is to accept them as they are and acknowledge the looseness. We want to remind readers of this uncertainty and to reiterate that throughout this section and the next we are dealing with perceived workload not actual monitored workload. For the sake of convenience, we use sentences like 'they spend x hours per week on...' but, in every instance, 'x' refers to the politicians' *estimates* of how much time they spend.

The first formal question we asked was 'How long do you spend on your job in an average week?'. We asked this first so that we would get their immediate impressions, rather than an estimate influenced by their answers to specific questions on committee meetings, etc. And we specifically asked them to base their answers on all the functions related to their office, including such elements as civic receptions. Table 2.1 gives their answers, in the form of the average length of work week for different council positions and for the area municipalities.

AVERAGE LENGTH OF WORK WEEK			
COUNCIL POSITION		MUNICIPALITY (ALL POSITIONS)	
Mayor	74.0 hrs.	Toronto	62.9 hrs.
Controller/Executive Alderman	64.5	East York	40.6
Alderman	43.0	Etobicoke	45.3
		North York	48.4
OVERALL AVERAGE	49.5 hrs.	Scarborough	52.1
		York	40.3

TABLE 2.1 AVERAGE LENGTH OF WORK WEEK, BY COUNCIL POSITION AND MUNICIPALITY*

*N=85 One controller and one alderman (both in North York) could not estimate.

For all municipal politicians in Metro, the average work week is 49 1/2 hours long or, to be precise, that is how long the politicians estimate it to be. Workload obviously bears some relation to council position, for mayors have the longest work week at 74 hours, followed by controllers and executive aldermen, and then aldermen, whose average work week is 43 hours. The right-hand column of Table 2.1 gives the averages for each municipality, with all council positions taken together. The general pattern is that Toronto councillors put in the longest week followed by those in the three suburban boroughs, and then politicians in York and East York, who come closest to the typical 40-hour week. As this table suggests, the difference between councillors with executive responsibilities and those with only regular council duties is an important one. We can examine the differences within each municipality on the basis of Table 2.2.

MUNICIPALITY	AVERAGE LENGTH OF WORK WEEK	
	Executive	Non-Executive
Toronto	72.4 hrs.	58.6 hrs.
East York*	-	35.0
Etobicoke	57.6	39.2
North York	71.3	41.4
Scarborough	63.2	47.5
York	68.3	29.8
OVERALL AVERAGE	67.0	43.0

TABLE 2.2 AVERAGE LENGTH OF WORK WEEK FOR EXECUTIVE AND NON-EXECUTIVE POSITIONS, BY MUNICIPALITY

The first point to note is that executive responsibilities carry roughly the same burden in all area municipalities, when compared to aldermanic duties. Except in Etobicoke, municipal executives work longer than 60 hours a week, on average. In Etobicoke, the figure is only slightly below 60, while in Toronto and North York, the average exceeds 70 hours a week. There is much greater variation among aldermen. The average aldermanic work week is almost twice as long in Toronto as it is in York. In three of the boroughs (East York, Etobicoke, and York), the average falls below a '40-hour week'. It is worth mentioning that Scarborough aldermen work longer hours than their counterparts in the other boroughs. To some extent,

*Since the mayor is the only member of East York Council with executive responsibilities, this figure has been omitted. However, the average for all executives does include the mayor of East York.

this may reflect the fact that Scarborough is the only borough with any significant amount of developable, vacant land, and many aldermen are involved in discussions between developers and residents on development proposals. However, as we shall discuss later, it may also reflect a political style in Scarborough which comes closer in some respects to the style in the City of Toronto.

One of the conclusions we might draw from these figures is that, for most politicians with executive responsibilities and for some aldermen (particularly those in Toronto), a public career consumes substantially more time than the average private job. It is easy to see the difficulty some politicians might have in combining their municipal duties with a private occupation. Even for aldermen in the smallest boroughs, who have the lightest workload, council responsibilities take up a considerable amount of time.

It is important to keep in mind the fact that politicians do not have control over some of the demands on their time. One good example is council meetings. Although politicians do have the choice of leaving the council meeting early, or not attending at all, our respondents were almost unanimous in saying that they scheduled their time around the regular council meetings. Most of them rarely miss a meeting and, on the infrequent occasions when they must attend another meeting at the same time, they make a brief appearance and return to council. In all municipalities, council meetings are held regularly every two weeks. The major exception is the City of Toronto, where it is common for meetings to be carried over to the following day or, in some cases, the following two days. The figures we provide on the length of council meetings are based on an average *month* (assuming two meetings a month) because there were some regular variations in the meetings; e.g., some councils hear public delegations at the first meeting in a month, but not at the second. Table 2.3 below gives the average length of council meetings per month, and includes the councillors' assessment of whether the meetings are too long or whether they are of a reasonable, or necessary, length.

MUNICIPALITY	COUNCIL MEETING TIME HOURS PER MONTH	ASSESSMENT	
		TOO LONG	ACCEPTABLE
Toronto	28.4 hrs/mo.	56.2%	31.2%
East York	9.9	22.2	77.8
Etobicoke	18.3	80.0	20.0
North York	17.5	78.9	21.1
Scarborough	18.7	94.1	5.9
York	19.5	72.7	9.0

TABLE 2.3 COUNCIL MEETING TIME* AND COUNCILLORS' ASSESSMENT,
BY MUNICIPALITY

The unusual length of Toronto's council meetings is worth noting, even though it is no surprise to veteran observers. Four of the boroughs have council meetings that take approximately the same amount of time - about 18 or 19 hours per month, or an average of 9-10 hours per meeting. East York's meetings are unusually short when compared to council meetings in the other municipalities and only in East York did a majority of the councillors surveyed believe that the meetings were an acceptable length.

In the other five municipalities, a majority of politicians thought the council meetings were too long. It is interesting that in Toronto, where the meetings are the longest, there was less dissatisfaction than in the other four municipalities. But even there, a majority was critical of the time it takes council to conduct municipal business. Many of our respondents offered explanations of their assessment and Table 2.4 gives a breakdown of the most common complaints.

*Based on averaging the answers given by councillors in each municipality.

MUNICIPALITY	REASONS FOR MEETINGS TAKING TOO LONG			
	Councillors Seeking Press Coverage	Poor Chairmanship	Inadequate Preparation by Members	Other
Toronto (N=9)	1	1	1	5
East York (N=2)	1	1	0	3
Etobicoke (N=12)	5	0	4	5
North York (N=15)	12	6	1	4
Scarborough (N=16)	4	2	5	3
York (N=8)	1	3	5	2
TOTAL (N=62)	24	13	16	22

TABLE 2.4 REASONS WHY MEETINGS ARE TOO LONG, BY MUNICIPALITY*

The reason most often cited was that 'council members talk for the press'. This complaint was particularly prevalent in North York, where 12 of the 15 councillors who thought the meetings were too long mentioned it. However, in North York and the other municipalities, there was a split in the group who gave 'press attention' as one of their reasons. Some were frankly critical of their colleagues. One politician said that he 'deplores the grandstanding of prima donnas'. Another argued that most of the debate could take place in committee but, he continued, 'there's no press there'. A third respondent criticized the council for being too media-conscious and said that the meetings would be shorter if the media were excluded. However, the other politicians took a different view of the problem. These councillors were critical of politicians who speak 'for the press', but they also mentioned the importance of press coverage. One agreed that the meetings would go faster if the press were excluded but also argued that 'a politician's life depends on the press he gets'. Another councillor explained that local politicians must rely on press coverage of their meetings because, unlike federal and provincial politicians, they do not have the resources to send out newsletters or use other mechanisms to communicate with the public.

*Based on remarks made by those who said that council meetings are too long. Rows do not add because not all respondents offered explanations, but many of those who did gave more than one reason.

Two other complaints dealt with chairmanship and preparation. Several councillors argued that council time was not used efficiently because the rules of order were not properly enforced. One alderman said this problem often occurred during the committee of the whole, where the chairmanship is rotated; 'some aldermen', he explained, 'just aren't very good chairmen'. Other politicians were critical of their colleagues' preparation. Several of them mentioned that councillors ask superfluous questions and drag out the debate because they have not researched the issues beforehand.

Various other explanations were offered for the length of council meetings. Some politicians argued that councils spend too much time on trivial matters that should be delegated to the staff or to standing committees. In some cases, the council does not have the power to delegate because provincial legislation requires that the matters be dealt with by full council. Others explained that the councils are not organized for efficient decision-making and have trouble coordinating the volume of material that comes before them. At least two politicians complained that councils spend too much time debating matters that are not within their jurisdiction. Others said that time could be saved if public delegations were heard at the committee level instead of at council.

For the most part, those listed as finding the amount of time taken up by council meetings 'acceptable' did not express positive approval, but rather a feeling that there is no practical way of shortening the meetings. Some politicians attributed the length of meetings to the nature of the democratic process. One described council meetings as 'the forum for democracy' and, according to another, the time they take is 'the price of democracy'. Several others argued that the council system itself is fine, but the problem is that a few people abuse it and nothing can be done to remedy the situation. At least one politician mentioned improvements in the way meetings are run. This (Toronto) alderman explained that time is used more efficiently because the City has adopted the executive committee system and because council does not sit in committee of the whole.

However, it was only in East York that councillors generally approved of the time devoted to council meetings. Several politicians said that the time is well used and referred to the small size of the council as one reason for its efficient meetings. One councillor said that they know their community well and therefore have greater familiarity with the matters under debate. Another mentioned the small town atmosphere and the council's policy of hearing public delegations, with or without notice; he remarked that the people like to discuss matters but there are no 'long harangues'. The level of satisfaction with council meetings is the first of several indicators of a particular political style in East York that is apparently based on a high level of consensus and an absence of seriously divisive issues.

Our respondents were also asked about the time they spend preparing for council meetings. Such preparation usually involves going over the agenda and attached material, collecting background information, and for some items, visiting sites in the municipality or talking to the people who will be affected. The time spent on preparation is normally the politician's own decision, but some of our respondents mentioned that they did not get the agenda far enough in advance to allow them to do all the background work they thought appropriate. Table 2.5 provides the figures.

AVERAGE COUNCIL PREPARATION TIME			
By Council Position		By Municipality (All Councillors)	
Mayor	11.0 hrs./mo.	Toronto	8.4 hrs./mo.
Controller/Executive Alderman	8.2	East York	9.8
Alderman	10.9	Etobicoke	12.2
		North York	10.1
OVERALL AVERAGE	10.3 hrs/mo.	Scarborough	10.8
		York	10.6

TABLE 2.5 AVERAGE PREPARTION TIME FOR COUNCIL MEETINGS, BY COUNCIL POSITION AND BY MUNICIPALITY

The first point is that all the figures are fairly close to the overall average; the differences among council positions and area municipalities are not all that large. Even so, the difference in the average figures for mayors and for controllers or executive aldermen may be surprising, since they share similar executive responsibilities and might be expected to have spent an equal amount of time examining the issues in committee. There are two explanations to be offered. Although mayors are on the executive committee/Board of Control and are ex-officio members of all standing committees, it is common practice in four municipalities for the mayor to spend less time on standing committees than the controllers do. These mayors go over the committee agendas but they attend the meetings irregularly, only when an item of particular interest is being considered. Therefore they are less familiar than controllers with committee debate. Furthermore, mayors have greater responsibility for initiating policies and for guiding council debate, and this may mean that they spend more time preparing for council meetings.

The average preparation time by municipality is interesting, particularly when we consider the time spent in council meetings and how the councillors assess it (Table 2.3). Etobicoke politicians spend about one-third more time preparing than Toronto councillors do, though Etobicoke council meetings are shorter and more Etobicoke councillors see poor preparation as a problem. The ratio of meeting time to preparation time is roughly 3 to 1 for Toronto, but 1 to 1 for East York. In the other four municipalities the ratio is more or less 2 to 1. Interpreting these figures is a risky

business. We might suggest, for instance, that meeting time varies inversely with preparation time. This argument would hold if we only considered East York and Toronto, but it falters badly when we include the other boroughs or take the politician's assessment of the preparation of their colleagues into account. A more convincing argument might be that the ratios reflect differences in political style. It is based on assuming that the emphasis on preparation in East York implies that, once politicians are well-versed on the issues, the discussion is fairly straightforward and they can reach a decision quite quickly. But in Toronto, according to this argument, the emphasis is on the debate itself. Although careful preparation is required, it is not a means of shortening the discussion, for the points at issue are matters of philosophy and political approach, not of fact. In the other four municipalities, the style is a combination of these two: some issues are relatively simple matters of fact but others involve a debate on values and philosophies. This argument has been simplified (i.e., the contrast between one extreme and the other is not as stark as we have pictured it). It may, however, be a fruitful line of thought.

Committee work is another important component of the local politician's job. The number of committees on which a politician sits depends on two factors: his council position and the council's committee structure. Mayors and other executive councillors sit on the board of control or executive committee as well as standing committees. The council as a whole can decide what committee structure it wishes to adopt. East York, for example, has eight standing committees, four regulatory and four operating, and each alderman sits on one set or the other. The Borough of York has four standing committees; each controller sits on two (in addition to the Board of Control) and each alderman on one. The length of the committee meetings depends on the number of items on the agenda and how much discussion or debate is required before the committee can reach a recommendation. As with council meetings, preparation for committee is at the discretion of the politician as long as the agenda is available well beforehand.

In Table 2.6, we examine the committee workload for controllers and aldermen. (As we have mentioned, four of the six mayors do not attend committee meetings regularly except for the board of control or executive committee). For each council position, we show the average number of committees, the total meeting time per month, the preparation time, and the overall monthly time involved in committee work.

MUNICIPALITY	CONTROLLERS/EXECUTIVE ALDERMEN					ALDERMEN			
	Average No. of Committees	Meeting Time	Preparation Time	Total		Average No. of Committees	Meeting Time	Preparation Time	Total
Toronto	3	32.8	21.0	53.8		2.2	20.1	14.5	34.6
East York	-	-	-	-		4	10.3	8.1	18.4
Etobicoke	3	23.0	11.3	34.3		2	7.5	9.0	16.5
North York	2.3	16.3	6.5	22.8		1.4	7.6	5.0	12.6
Scarborough	1.8	22.3	14.7	37.0		1.3	9.3	6.3	15.6
York	3	16.5	12.0	28.5		1.0	6.1	3.8	9.9

TABLE 2.6 COMMITTEE WORKLOAD (HOURS PER MONTH) FOR CONTROLLERS AND ALDERMEN, BY MUNICIPALITY

It is difficult to absorb so many figures, let alone assign meanings to them. The detail is provided for the reader's information but we shall focus the discussion on the final column in each half of the table, which represents the total monthly time commitment to standing committees for controllers and aldermen in each municipality. First of all, comparing the two council positions, we can see that in every case except North York, controllers spend more than twice as much time on committee work as aldermen do, on average. In North York, controllers' time is not quite twice the time aldermen spend. The increased workload represents the time involved in executive committee or board of control per se and also includes the added responsibility of being 'executive' members of standing committees.

The differences among municipalities follow roughly the same pattern in both categories. Toronto politicians, whether executive aldermen or aldermen, spend substantially more time on committee work than their counterparts in the other municipalities. In East York, where there are no controllers or executive aldermen, aldermen devote more time to committees than aldermen in the other boroughs, perhaps *because* the council as a whole acts as executive committee. Controllers in Scarborough and Etobicoke have more committee work than those in York and North York, and the same is true of their aldermen. If we compare council time with committee time, there is no clear pattern that a greater commitment to one means less time spent on the other. In fact, except for East York, the opposite seems true; i.e., workload is likelier to be heavier in both or lighter in both when all the municipalities are taken together.

There is one other important point to be made. We have so far only discussed the workload arising from standing committees and boards of control and executive committee. In most municipalities, there are many ad hoc committees and special subcommittees that take up the councillors' time. These bodies deal with a wide variety of subjects, including public relations, environmental control, new municipal buildings, annual festivals, staff pensions, neighbourhood services, electoral reform, grants and liaison with neighbouring non-Metro municipalities. Although some of them meet infrequently and require very little work, others impose a significant additional burden. We cannot

provide data on these ad hoc committees because there are so many problems involved in comparing them across municipalities. It is our impression from the interviews that they usually involve considerably less work than standing committees but, in the case of some politicians, ad hoc committees represent as much or more work (over a 6-8 month period) than the standing committees of council. In any case, they are another aspect of the councillors' job to keep in mind.

Serving on local boards is another of the municipal politician's responsibilities. Local councils are called upon to make appointments to a wide range of special purpose bodies that are active in the community. Some of them have a considerable impact on local affairs; the planning board and board of health are good examples. Others, like the boards of directors of hospitals and the safety councils, are less directly involved in matters of concern to local government.

In Table 2.7, we provide figures on the average time involved in serving on local boards; they show that there is very little variation among municipalities.

MUNICIPALITY	AVERAGE COMMITMENT (meeting and preparation)
Toronto	9.4 hours/month
East York	7.3
Etobicoke	8.7
North York	8.5
Scarborough	8.9
York	9.1

TABLE 2.7 AVERAGE TIME COMMITMENT TO LOCAL BOARDS, BY MUNICIPALITY*

* N=65. Based on those who serve on boards (69) and could supply estimates of the time involved. We should note that these figures are inflated, because we have excluded the 18 politicians who do not serve on any local boards.

Among those who do sit on local special purpose bodies, there are significant differences based not on municipality but on the boards involved. In general, the planning boards and the boards of health involve the largest time commitment. For most but not all of the others, the time required is quite short because the meetings last only 2 or 3 hours and there is little or no preparation involved. In fact, one-third of those serving on local boards spend fewer than five hours per month at board meetings and, for about one-quarter of councillors, the boards require little or no preparation. Roughly 10% spend more than twenty hours a month at local board meetings and more than ten hours a month in preparation. Some of these politicians, and the others with a substantial time commitment to local boards, serve on a planning board, a board of health, or both. Others serve on time-consuming bodies like a housing company board of directors or on a series of boards which together constitute a considerable workload.

It is difficult to generalise about the demands of local boards because our data are organized by council position and by municipality, while the significant variable here is the *type* of local board. From the interviews, we gathered the impression that local board commitments are not a significant part of the job for a majority of local politicians. By serving on special purpose bodies, they may help co-ordinate local activities and can represent a local government point of view, but compared to their council and committee work, this is a relatively small part of their responsibilities. The major exceptions, however, are the politicians who serve on the 'heavy' boards noted above. In their case, local board activities are a significant part of the workload and the time involved can be as great or greater than the time involved in a major committee of council.

The final element to be considered is the time municipal politicians spend dealing with constituency matters. In general, this time is devoted to solving, or trying to solve, constituents' problems. Most respondents said that a majority of these problems fall within the jurisdiction of the area or Metropolitan municipality. However, almost all of them are faced with some federal and provincial matters, and problems of a private, non-governmental nature.

The most commonly mentioned federal problems involved unemployment insurance and immigration. Within the province's jurisdiction, problems relating to the Ontario Housing Corporation (usually involving public housing) and workmen's compensation were the most common. Some respondents said that their policy is to intervene on behalf of their constituents.

One borough politician said that he has gone to Compensation Board hearings with his constituents on several occasions. Other councillors usually refer people to the appropriate federal or provincial body, and some of them mentioned that they have established working relationships with their area's M.P. and M.P.P. In some cases, constituents also approach their councillor with problems relating to the board of education or about private disputes with neighbours.

Many of the politicians in our survey commented that people do not seem to know where to turn for help so they call on their municipal councillor because he is the most visible and most accessible public official. One politician said that, even when he was out of office (after having served as alderman for some years), he got as many calls as he had during his time on council. However, there were several aldermen who described their wards as upper-middle class areas where people solve their own problems or go directly to the appropriate agency.

The figures on constituency time are given in Table 2.8, broken down by council position and by municipality. We should remind readers that the estimates are based on an average *week*, unlike the figures on council, committee, and local board time. It is clear that, in most cases, constituency affairs account for the largest single block of the municipal politician's time.

AVERAGE CONSTITUENCY TIME PER WEEK			
COUNCIL POSITION		MUNICIPALITY	
Mayor	12.0 hours	Toronto	15.7
Controller	7.0	East York	6.9
Executive		Etobicoke	7.4
Alderman	11.5	North York	11.8
Alderman	13.4	Scarborough	16.9
		York	10.6
OVERALL AVERAGE	12.2		

TABLE 2.8 AVERAGE CONSTITUENCY TIME, BY COUNCIL POSITION AND BY MUNICIPALITY*

*N=80. Seven councillors could not estimate.

The breakdown by position indicates that most constituent demands are handled by ward alderman, as one might expect. For the purposes of this table, we have given figures for controllers and executive aldermen separately. Although many of their responsibilities are similar, executive alderman are elected to the position of ward alderman and are assumed to have the regular constituency obligations that go with that position. Some controllers regard their position as entailing more administrative duties and less constituency time. One controller said that he regularly refers constituents to their own ward alderman. The figures given here tend to support this distinction between the two positions. However, all executive aldermen are from the City of Toronto and some of the difference may be attributable to other differences between the City and the other municipalities. Mayors spend more time with constituents, on average, than other politicians with executive responsibilities. This might be explained by the mayor's symbolic importance as head of council.

If we examine constituency time by municipality, we can suggest pairing municipalities together. Scarborough and Toronto (16.9 and 15.7) would form one pair, North York and York (11.8 and 10.6) another, and Etobicoke and East York (7.4 and 6.9) would be the third pair. This pattern implies identifiable differences among municipalities in their politicians' constituency activity. Two important factors underlie the proposed pattern: one is the level of demands made by constituents and the other is the politician's approach to constituency work. Constituents' requests for assistance, we can argue, are highly correlated with the type of activity within a municipality. Where development or redevelopment are taking place, the municipal council exercises considerable authority. Because such activity is likely to affect residents or cause them concern, they will make demands of municipal politicians to have their problems solved or at least have their cases heard. On the other hand, residents in more 'settled' municipalities may have fewer concerns that they take to their municipal councillors. The other factor is what we might loosely term the politician's populist orientation. Some municipal councillors see their role as ombudsman for the average citizen, while others emphasize the importance of efficient and effective municipal administration. These factors are not independent of each other. Frequent and repeated constituent demands will eventually bring about the election of councillors who will respond to them. At the same time, if politicians are readily accessible and receptive to constituents' requests, more constituents will be encouraged to approach them more often.

Our argument is that both these factors are at work in the area municipalities. In Scarborough and Toronto, where constituency time is highest, the situation is a reflection

both of high constituency demand and the politicians' populist orientations. In contrast, the practice in East York and Etobicoke of spending substantially less time with constituents reflects the relatively low incidence of issues that are of serious concern to large groups of constituents and the greater administrative orientation of the councillors. North York and York combine these two patterns. York, for example, is faced with comparatively few development problems, but the issues of the Spadina subway and proposed roadway are important ones for many residents. This explanation is a preliminary one, and subject to further testing, but it seems a reasonable suggestion given what we know at present.

We asked our respondents two questions that might have a bearing on this subject. One asked them to identify their most important functions, and the other to tell us whether they see themselves as delegates of their constituents or as representatives elected to exercise their own judgment. Both questions were disappointing in the sense that they did not elicit a variety of answers. For instance, to the first question, 71 of our 87 respondents replied that their function is to represent the people who elected them (or some variation on that theme). Many identified more than one function, so that 19 respondents also said that decision-making was one of their important functions, and 25 mentioned efficient administration of the municipality as a major responsibility. Thirteen (13) specifically referred to their roles as leaders and educators of the public, and another 10 gave a variety of answers including a responsibility to ensure that their ward got a fair share of the money being spent, to ensure that the radical members of the council did not 'destroy' the municipality and, in a more philosophical vein, to translate the wishes of the people into a workable social pattern. Because answers varied widely in their detail and because respondents did not interpret the question the same way, we cannot provide a fair and reliable breakdown by municipality or by position.

Similar problems occurred with the second question, about the perceived relationship to constituents. Eighty-four (84) of the 87 respondents answered that they were elected to exercise their own judgement and to act as leaders. Many of them said they would, of course, solicit the views of their constituents, but they also said that the final responsibility was their own. Some also commented that, if their constituents disapproved of their council actions, it would be up to the constituents to vote them out of office. Only three respondents leaned toward the delegate point of view and saw their role as reflecting the majority view among their constituents. But even in these three instances, the councillors would not always take precisely the position their constituents support; they also mentioned that they would ultimately have to justify their course of action.

In general, we have found that a majority of municipal politicians in Metro Toronto work longer than a 40-hour week. The time demands are particularly heavy for mayors and other politicians with executive responsibilities, whose average work week exceeds 60 hours. With the exception of some controllers, politicians spend the largest block of their time dealing with constituency affairs. The excepted controllers spend more time on council committees than on constituency matters, reflecting the perception among some of them that the focus of their job is municipal administration.

There are wide variations in the time spent on council and committee meetings. We have suggested that council meeting time may reflect the importance of philosophical differences within councils and that committee time may follow the same pattern, except in East York, where the time devoted to committee work is in part attributed to the fact that East York has no executive committee or Board of Control.

Except for those on planning boards, boards of health, and other time-consuming local boards, serving on local special purpose bodies is not a significant element in the municipal politicians' workload. However, the boards that do demand a substantial commitment are also those of particular concern to the councils as policy bodies. This raises the question of whether the councils as a whole can keep abreast of developments in these areas.

Time spent on constituency affairs appears to follow a pattern based on the level of constituents' demands and the orientation of politicians. We have argued that the greater constituency efforts in Scarborough and Toronto are attributable to greater constituent concern about the issues of development and redevelopment and the politicians' response to that concern. In Etobicoke and East York, there is a stronger emphasis on efficient administration, in part because of the absence of issues of major concern to constituents.

Although this discussion has considered the main elements of the municipal politicians' workload and has examined the systematic differences, we should point out that much of the municipal councillors' time cannot readily be categorised. A considerable amount of time is spent in going over material that is not specifically preparation for council or committee work, in discussing various subjects with the civic staff, in regular office administration, and so on.

PART THREE: THE JOB OF THE METRO COUNCILLOR

In Metropolitan Toronto, all members of Metro council are also members of a local council, with the exception of the Metro Chairman. All of them sit on Metro council by virtue of holding local political office. For about half the members (mayors and controllers), local election automatically entails Metro council membership. However, this is not the case for aldermanic members, who are sent to Metro either because they won the greatest number of votes in ward elections (as in Toronto) or because the council as a whole voted to put them on Metro council (as in Scarborough, North York, and East York). In all, roughly 40% of municipal politicians combine local and Metro responsibilities.

This system has been the focus of considerable debate. Some have argued that there should be direct election to Metro council, but they are not agreed on whether politicians should sit on both local and Metro councils. One side argues that the responsibilities should be separated and some also propose that the separation should be emphasized by having Metro wards that cut across area municipality boundaries. Others support the present approach of combining responsibilities. Some of them favour the adaptation of the board of control system so that the number of controllers elected at large, plus the mayor, will equal the size of the municipality's delegation to Metro Council. They argue that this gives voters a direct say in the choice of their Metro councillors without getting into the problems of Metro wards and serious local/Metro conflict. Others support a system of two-member wards where one member would be elected to Metro Council and the other to the local council. Some politicians are in favour of the present system of representation with some modifications. One Toronto politician, who sees no need for direct election to Metro, argued that the council should select all Metro representatives from among its own ranks to avoid having first-term aldermen who have no council experience going to Metro council, as they now do if they top the polls in their wards.

There are several issues involved in this debate. One is the question of accountability of Metro councillors. Many people have expressed concern over the situation where Metro councillors do not run for their Metro positions and are therefore not specifically accountable for the actions taken by Metro council. Others are more concerned about ensuring co-ordination of local and Metro policies and tend to regard the issue of direct accountability as secondary. But another important question is whether any politician can combine both local and Metro responsibilities, and fulfil both satisfactorily. This question is considered especially important because 24 of the 37 Metro councillors not only sit on a local council but also have local executive responsibilities; 13 of these 24 politicians sit on Metro executive as well.

Our examination of the job of the Metro councillor does not provide answers to these questions, but it does provide some information that may be of help. We begin our discussion with a look at some of the major components of the Metro workload. According to the estimates given by the Metro councillors in our survey, Metro council meetings take up about 16.4 hours per month. As in the area municipalities, the Metro council meetings represent a more or less fixed commitment for councillors.

It is important to point out that Metro council meetings are shorter than the local council meetings in all municipalities except East York. It is possible that the meetings are shorter because the time is used more efficiently, but the information we have suggests that not all Metro councillors would support such an assessment. Several politicians argued that Metro council meetings are more efficient; one councillor remarked that 'options tend to be presented and discussed more intelligently'. But several others complained that considerable time is wasted. At least one politician expressed concern that there is not enough debate at the Metro level. He said that 'a neighbourhood sidewalk will get more discussion in the City than a sewage treatment plant will at Metro', and argued that they should take more time at Metro because the decisions involved are both important and costly. We cannot evaluate Metro council meetings simply on the basis of how much time they take, nor is it appropriate to treat local council meetings as the benchmark for judging Metro council meetings. Nevertheless, one of the important points in debate about the present system is that local politicians cannot devote enough time to Metro business. Therefore, the comparisons between local and Metro structures should not be ignored.

The time spent preparing for Metro council meetings is subject to the politicians' discretion. Table 3.1 shows the average preparation time per month by (local) council position and by area municipality.

AVERAGE PREPARATION TIME FOR METRO COUNCIL MEETINGS			
Local Council Position		Municipality	
Mayor	5.7 hrs/mo.	Toronto	5.8 hrs/mo.
Controller/Executive Alderman	8.4	East York	5.0
		Etobicoke	6.6
Alderman	8.3	North York	7.1
		Scarborough	14.2
OVERALL AVERAGE	7.9	York	10.0

TABLE 3.1 AVERAGE PREPARATION TIME FOR METRO COUNCIL, BY LOCAL COUNCIL POSITION AND BY MUNICIPALITY*

*N=33 One controller could not estimate.

The difference between mayors and other Metro councillors is a noticeable one. The most plausible explanation is that all mayors have Metro executive responsibilities and deal with many subjects in executive committee; therefore, they may have less special preparation to do for council meetings. In contrast, only seven of the eighteen controllers and executive aldermen sit on Metro executive, and none of the ten aldermen does. This suggestion is supported when we group all the Metro executive committee members together and compare them to the others. The average preparation time for all executives is 5.7 hours per month (i.e., the same as for mayors alone), while for non-executive members, it is 9.1 hours per month. Although we can suggest that the difference is explained by the fact that executive committee members are more familiar with agenda items and thus have less need to prepare, we should also point out that they may have less time available for Metro council preparation because of the volume of their other Metro work and their local council and executive responsibilities.

The figures for municipalities are less easily explained. Politicians in York and in Scarborough spend considerably longer than the others preparing for Metro council. In fact, Scarborough councillors devote twice as much time as any others (except those in York). Perhaps Metro council has spent more time debating matters of concern to these politicians, e.g., transportation facilities, and as a consequence they have spent more time preparing to argue their municipality's position. On the other hand, councillors in these two municipalities may simply take a greater interest in Metro affairs. However, we must also note that seats on the executive committee are not divided equally among area municipalities, but are assigned roughly according to municipal population. Therefore, the municipal averages are, to some extent, masking the effects of executive committee workload; that is, the Toronto average is based on 4 executive members and 5 non-executive members, while the York average is based on 1 executive member and 2 non-executive members. The different relative weight of executive members creates some 'artificial' difference among municipalities.

If our earlier remarks about the difference between those with executive responsibilities and those with only regular Metro council duties are to hold, we would expect to see a substantial difference between them in committee work. The figures are provided in Table 3.2

We should point out that the breakdown is based on different categories than those we have used in other tables. The first, member of Metro executive, includes the six mayors and seven controllers/executive aldermen who sit on Metro executive committee. The second category comprises the eleven politicians who have local executive responsibilities but are not members of Metro executive. The final category 'aldermen' includes all ten of the ward politicians who have neither local nor Metro executive responsibilities, but who do sit on Metro council.

TIME SPENT ON METRO COMMITTEES			
Position	Meeting Time	Preparation Time	Total
Member of Metro Executive	13.8 *	10.6	24.4 hrs/mo
Other Controllers & Executive Aldermen	7.3	4.1	11.4
Aldermen	6.2	4.9	11.1

TABLE 3.2 AVERAGE METRO COMMITTEE TIME, BY POSITION

This table shows that Metro executive members spend twice as long on Metro committee work as the other Metro councillors. In addition to sitting on the Metro executive committee, most of them sit on one of the executive subcommittees and on a standing committee of Metro council. Among the other Metro councillors, it is usual for them to sit only on one standing committee**. The time spent on Metro committees, though significant, is less than the time spent on local committee work. If we refer back to Table 2.6, we can see that in all but one municipality, controllers and executive aldermen spend more time on local committees than Metro executives spend on all Metro committees. The same pattern holds true when we compare local 'non-executives' with Metro 'non-executives'. In all but one municipality, local committee work involves more time than Metro committee work for these councillors. Again, we should avoid concluding that *not enough* time is spent on Metro committees, but we should not lose sight of this comparison.

*Includes Metro executive committee meetings.

**One alderman and two controllers sit on two standing committees.

Another element of the Metro councillors' workload is the time spent on Metro boards. Like the area municipal councils, Metro council appoints its members to a variety of special purpose bodies including the Canadian National Exhibition Association, the Children's Aid Societies, the Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, the Toronto Transit Commission, and many others. We mentioned earlier that serving on local boards is not a major aspect of the municipal politician's work, and the same is true of appointments to most Metro boards. Ten of the Metro councillors do not serve on any Metro-level special purpose body. Of the twenty-four who do, the majority devotes a comparatively small amount of time to board meetings and preparation. In fact, Metro board responsibilities take up more than ten hours per month for only five Metro councillors. Boards with the heaviest workloads are the Licensing Commission, the Board of Commissioners of Police, and the Toronto Transit Commission. The latter two involve frequent meetings as well as substantial day-to-day administration and handling of complaints. Two Metro councillors each serve on several Metro boards and it is the combined workload that represents a sizable time commitment. In general, however, the work involved in Metro boards is not a significant part of the Metro councillor's obligations.

These three components (council meetings, committee meetings and Metro boards) represent the readily identifiable parts of the Metro councillors' job but they do not present a complete picture. As in their local jobs, Metro councillors spend a certain amount of time on administration and on dealing with background material that is not specifically preparation for council or committee meetings, discussing matters with the civic staff, and attending informal meetings with their colleagues.

We asked our respondents about the total proportion of their time they devote to Metro affairs. Their answers are given in Table 3.3.

PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT ON METRO AFFAIRS			
POSITION		MUNICIPALITY(METRO COUNCILLIORS)	
Member of Metro Executive (N=13)	37.9%	Toronto	31.8%
Other Controllers & Executive Aldermen (N=11)	34.4	East York	40.0
		Etobicoke	40.6
		North York	33.3
		Scarborough	40.0
Aldermen (N=10)	30.3	York	21.7
OVERALL	34.5%		

TABLE 3.3 PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT ON METRO AFFAIRS, BY POSITION AND BY MUNICIPALITY

In general, politicians who combine local and Metro responsibilities spend an average of 34.5% of their time on Metro business. The percentage is highest among the mayors, controllers, and executive aldermen who sit on Metro executive committee, and lowest among the ward aldermen on Metro council. Controllers and executive aldermen who are not on Metro executive spend a higher proportion of their time on Metro business than aldermen do, even though they have local executive responsibilities that the aldermen do not have. Perhaps one factor is that controllers (10 out of the 11 members of this group) are elected at large, and they may feel a greater responsibility for representing the whole municipality at Metro council.

When we examine these figures by municipality, we can see that the average proportion of time spent on Metro affairs ranges from a high of about 40% in East York, Etobicoke, and Scarborough to a low of 21.7% in York. North York politicians spend about one-third of their time on Metro business, and the average in Toronto is just slightly below that. The difference between the proportion of time spent by York politicians and the others is quite substantial, and it contradicts an earlier suggestion that York politicians may spend more time preparing for Metro council because they are more interested in Metro affairs than other politicians are. Perhaps they spend more time preparing for council because their overall involvement with Metro business is lower than average.

The purpose of asking for percentage of time devoted to Metro affairs, rather than the actual time, was to get the politician's immediate perception of the importance of his Metro responsibilities. But we must also consider that there are variations in the total workload by municipality and therefore variations in the *actual* amount of time they spend on Metro business. For instance, if one politician spent 40% of his time on Metro affairs and worked a 40-hour week, while another spent 25% of his time on Metro but worked 60 hours a week, an examination of the percentage alone would obscure the fact that they both spent about 15 hours a week on Metro business.

Although the figures must be treated with caution*, Table 3.4 gives the approximate time per week politicians devote to their Metro role.

AVERAGE HOURS PER WEEK ON METRO AFFAIRS (APPROXIMATE)			
POSITION		MUNICIPALITY	
Member of Metro Executive	27.7 hrs/wk.	Toronto	21.7 hrs/wk.
Other Controllers/ Executive Aldermen	21.3	East York	27.0
		Etobicoke	22.3
		North York	22.2
Aldermen	16.3	Scarborough	25.4
OVERALL	22.3 hrs/week	York	14.7

TABLE 3.4 APPROXIMATE TIME PER WEEK ON METRO AFFAIRS, BY POSITION AND BY MUNICIPALITY

The point of this table is to adjust the percentages given in Table 3.3 for variations in the length of the work week in different municipalities and among politicians with different responsibilities. However, we can see that the pattern does not vary all that much. When we take total working time into account, the differences by position are

*These figures must be treated with special caution because they are not based on direct answers from our respondents. They were calculated by applying the percentage of time spent on Metro affairs to the total work week for each respondent and their taking the relevant group average.

greater, but members of Metro executive are still highest and aldermen still lowest. Among municipalities, the differences are smaller and the pattern changes slightly. East York and Scarborough politicians devote more time to Metro on average than the other politicians; Toronto, Etobicoke, and North York averages are slightly lower, and the figure for York remains noticeably below the others. We should emphasise that these figures are not based on direct answers from our respondents but on our calculations using their direct answers.

The general pattern is that municipal politicians spend about one-third of their time on Metro responsibilities, with more time spent by members of Metro executive and less by ward aldermen without local or Metro executive duties. One of the questions to be asked is whether this is enough time, given the powers and responsibilities of the Metro level. Another question concerns the problems politicians have in combining the two sets of responsibilities. Do those with only local responsibilities spend substantially more time on their local council work than Metro councillors do and, if so, what are the implications? We begin this discussion with a comparison of the workload for Metro and non-Metro politicians.

AVERAGE LENGTH OF WORK WEEK		
MUNICIPALITY	LOCAL AND METRO	LOCAL ONLY
Toronto	68.6 hrs/week	55.7 hrs/week
East York	67.5	32.8
Etobicoke	57.6	39.2
North York	58.1	39.8
Scarborough	61.0	47.3
York	68.3	29.6
OVERALL AVERAGE	62.9	40.9

TABLE 3.5 COMPARISON OF AVERAGE LENGTH OF WORK WEEK FOR METRO AND NON-METRO COUNCILLORS, BY MUNICIPALITY

The first point to keep in mind is that 24 of the 34 Metro councillors included in our survey have local executive responsibilities. To some extent, the differences reflect this added burden as well as the additional Metro obligations. There are other qualifications to keep in mind:

- a) All the 'local only' politicians are ward aldermen who have certain obvious constituency responsibilities. As we saw in the previous chapter, these councillors spend more time dealing with constituents than other politicians do. This point is particularly relevant to Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, and York, where the Metro category includes controllers who are elected at large and who in many cases, do not regard constituency affairs as a major part of their job.
- b) There is probably a certain amount of overlap in responsibilities. Issues are considered at the local level, particularly when an area municipality's position on a subject is being established, and then again at Metro. In such cases, the Metro councillors will not have to undertake additional preparation for the Metro council debate.
- c) Some local aldermen spend a considerable amount of time familiarising themselves with Metro issues even though they do not sit on Metro council. This is especially common among aldermen who have served on Metro council in the past. Therefore, the local workload may contain a Metro component.

From these points, we can see that the comparison of combined Metro/local workload and local workload is not clear cut. Nonetheless, the qualifications do not account for all the disparities. If we compare the figures for Toronto, where the difference between Metro and non-Metro workloads is quite small, with the figures for East York and York, where the differences are substantially greater, we must conclude that Toronto politicians do not have the same freedom of action in combining their local and Metro obligations that Metro councillors from York and East York have. In Toronto and Scarborough, and to a lesser extent in Etobicoke and North York, politicians who combine local and Metro responsibilities appear to be faced with difficult choices in how they are going to allocate their time. No matter how important they regard Metro business, none of them cannot afford to neglect their local responsibilities even if they want to concentrate on Metro issues, for it is at the local level that they must win re-election.

We made the point earlier that some of the Metro councillors have local and Metro executive responsibilities, while all the non-Metro politicians serve as ward aldermen. It is possible to compare average workload according to level of responsibilities, and Table 3.6 gives the breakdown when all municipalities are taken together.

AVERAGE LENGTH OF WORK WEEK	
Local Aldermen* (N=34)	44.1 hours/week
Aldermen on Metro Council (N=10)	53.5
Controllers and Executive Aldermen on Metro Council (N=11)	59.3
Members of Local and Metro Executive (n=13)	72.9
OVERALL AVERAGE	49.5

TABLE 3.6 AVERAGE WORK WEEK, BY LEVEL OF LOCAL AND METRO RESPONSIBILITIES

This table clearly shows that the average work week is related to the level of responsibilities. To get an idea of the effects of Metro responsibilities, we can compare local aldermen with aldermen who sit on Metro council; neither has executive duties so the difference between them can be attributed to Metro council membership. The other comparison is between the controllers and executive aldermen who sit on Metro council and the members of Metro executive; the systematic difference between them is membership on Metro executive committee, because members of both groups sit on Metro council and have local executive duties. Among aldermen, the average difference in workload that we can tentatively attribute specifically to membership on Metro council is 9.4 hours per week. Between the other groups, the average difference (hypothetically due to membership in Metro executive committee) is 13.6 hours per week.

Although these differences are, in theory, attributable to the Metro variable, it is possible that they are in part due to differences among municipalities. But it is difficult to examine level of responsibilities and municipality simultaneously, because there are so few cases in each category. In some instances, there is only one person in a category (e.g. East York alderman on Metro council), so the

*We are only including aldermen from Toronto, East York, North York and Scarborough. In Etobicoke and York, no aldermen sit on Metro council so including their working time in the local average would only obscure the comparison we are trying to make.

the figure involved is not an average at all, but only one person's activity. This problem makes it impossible for us to provide a complete breakdown, not only because of our assurance of anonymity to the respondents but also because individual work styles are a much more important factor when only one or two respondents are involved. We would be on very shaky ground if we tried to attribute the variations to institutional factors like level of responsibility or area municipality.

However, we can offer a few tentative comments based on a comparison of Metro and local alderman in North York and Toronto, where there are at least four people in each category. For Toronto local aldermen, the average work week is 55.7 hours long, and for the Metro aldermen, 63.8 hours. Thus the difference between them is 8.1 hours. In North York, local aldermen spend an average of 39.8 hours per week on their responsibilities, while the figure for Metro aldermen is 45.0 hours, for a difference between the two groups of 5.2 hours. We can offer several comments about these results. First of all, we must acknowledge a point made earlier about the possibility that some local councillors regularly spend time on Metro affairs. Secondly, Toronto aldermen all serve in 2-member wards, while the wards in North York have only one alderman. This means that Toronto constituents can call on their other ward representative if the Metro councillor is not readily available. In North York, no such alternative exists, and the alderman must always be on hand for his constituents or face the consequences.

The third point is that the differences are quite small. When we consider that Metro is responsible for making decisions involving a budget of more than \$700 million a year, for a community of more than 2 million people, it is clear that the decisions should be made with a good deal of care. But the same is true of the local municipalities. These aldermen are faced with the responsibility of serving both their local communities (which are both very large urban areas) and the Metro community. Given the figures on average work weeks, we must ask if the politicians *can* do full justice to both jobs. We hasten to add that we have chosen these examples because our figures are most reliable in these two cases. Exactly the same conflict faces most other Metro councillors, even though we cannot provide fair averages to illustrate their dilemma.

In addition to these figures on Metro workload and the combination of Metro and local responsibilities, we have some information about how the politicians regard politics at the Metro level and how they perceive their role as Metro councillors. Some of them made observations about the conduct of Metro affairs. We have included these comments

in other parts of this section but there are other remarks that should also be mentioned. Several politicians were critical of Metro council because it is, in their opinion, too large a body for effective debate. Two of them argued in favour of direct elections to Metro as a way of reducing the size of the council without interfering with the principle of representation by population. Another councillor added that the size of the executive committee should also be reduced; he called it nonsense to have an executive committee with thirteen members (excluding the Metro chairman).

Quite a number of borough politicians mentioned that they do not spend as much time with the Metro staff as they would like, partly because it would take them too much time to travel from their borough offices to Toronto City Hall on all the occasions where they would like to have direct conversations with the staff. Several of them mentioned that they would prefer to see Metro departments more centrally located. One borough controller particularly objected to the fact that Toronto politicians have a clear advantage over Metro councillors from the boroughs because Metro departments are in Toronto City Hall. Although the location of Metro departments was not a major issue, it is a point worth considering, especially since Metro councillors have so many demands on their time. The same point was raised in connection with travelling time to Metro council meetings. Although few politicians described it as an important problem, some said they were inconvenienced by having to travel downtown; several councillors said they could not travel by TTC (and use their time reading council or committee material) because too often the meetings end after TTC service has stopped for the night.

We asked our Metro council respondents to give us their views on citizen participation at the Metro level. At least a dozen of them said they thought citizen participation was low at Metro. Several of them argued that there were not adequate mechanisms for participation, and others said that participation is limited because Metro council is too far removed from the people, both literally and figuratively. One councillor argued that Metro deliberately makes it harder for the public to make deputations and blamed the situation on the fact that no one feels responsible for what happens at Metro because all the Metro councillors are locally elected.

But just as many Metro councillors did not agree with this assessment. Some of them said that the mechanisms for participation are perfectly adequate; one of them concluded his observations by saying that he has never heard of

anyone being turned away. Others were critical of the nature of citizen participation at Metro. Two politicians argued that participation is overemphasized and leads to a situation where small minority groups have undue influence on Metro council decisions. Another was frankly disapproving of citizen participation; in his view, 'things were better' before it became generally accepted; all it does is 'bugger up everything'. One group of politicians argued that citizen participation at the Metro level is essentially directed at *opposing* what Metro is considering. Several of them expressed concern that there is little positive participation and that few citizens approach Metro council unless they are directly affected by the proposal under consideration. One or two politicians thought there would be more citizen participation at the Metro level if citizens knew more about what Metro does. In this regard, we should mention that roughly 90% of municipal politicians, both on Metro or only on local councils, think citizens have little knowledge about Metro affairs and about the division of responsibilities between Metro and the area municipalities. As one councillor put it, 'citizens have absolutely no clue; Metropolitan Toronto to the average person means absolutely nothing'.

In addition to the question on citizen participation, we asked our Metro council respondents how they perceived their role. The question specifically asked them whether they see themselves primarily as representatives of their area municipality, or as responsible to the Metropolitan community as a whole. Just under 70% of them thought their role was a combination of the two approaches. Thirty-eight percent (38%) said that both aspects were important but that their first responsibility was to their area municipality. One of them argued that 'most Metro councillors are protecting parochial interests' and said that Metro council 'doesn't appreciate' his own municipality so he has to look out for its interests. About 12% said they tried to serve the interests of their area municipality and Metro equally. One councillor remarked that in some circumstances, (e.g., chairing a Metro committee), one must take a Metro-wide point of view, but in others, the responsibility is to represent the area municipality. About 18% said they represent both interests but that they usually put Metro first. One person said that he votes according to the Metro interest, as he sees it, but that he feels a responsibility to explain his borough's concerns to other Metro politicians.

Slightly less than 25% said that their responsibility is to the Metropolitan community as a whole. Some of them said it is difficult to divorce themselves from the

interests of their own area municipality but it is important to do the best they can to see things from a Metro point of view. The remaining 3 Metro councillors gave different answers. One simply described himself as 'on the opposition' at Metro. Another said that his responsibility is to represent his ward on Metro council, not his area municipality as a whole. The third councillor could not answer the question. These results indicate that only about one-quarter of Metro councillors consistently take a Metro view of the matters under debate, and that the majority try to combine the interests of their area municipality and the Metro community as a whole. In four municipalities, the distribution followed the overall pattern. The two exceptions are East York, where the Metro councillors said that they tried to represent the whole Metro community, and York, where they tended to combine both interests but to put the borough first on issues where it would be affected.

Our findings about the job of the Metro councillor tend to reinforce concerns about the manageability of combined local and Metro responsibilities. Most Metro councillors devote only about one-third of their time to Metro affairs, and spend less time on Metro council and committee work than on their local council work. This does not necessarily mean that Metro responsibilities are neglected but the pattern suggests that some municipal politicians may be more concerned about their job as local councillor than about their Metro role. Irrespective of how councillors regard the two sets of responsibilities, many of them face serious problems in trying to strike an appropriate balance between them. Our interpretation of the data is that most municipal councillors devote a (more or less) fixed amount of time to their Metro council and committee work, and above and beyond that, the time they give to Metro is what they can spare from their local responsibilities. This is certainly what one would expect since councillors must win re-election at the local level.

PART FOUR: REMUNERATION AND RESOURCES

This section deals with the salary and expense allowance* paid to municipal politicians, and with the resources available to them in their work. While both subjects have been the cause of some concern among politicians, the question of salary is regarded as the more important and more sensitive issue.

In general, there are two forces at work when the level of remuneration is being set. Some people have emphasized the need for local government to offer salaries comparable to those in the private sector and in other levels of government because it must compete with them for high calibre candidates. At the very least, it is argued, local government must ensure that the level of remuneration is not a deterrent to potential candidates for local public office. But there is considerable pressure from the taxpayers to keep salaries low. Although taxpayers are usually unwilling to see any politicians vote themselves a salary increase, this opposition can be greater at the local level. Taxpayers may think the job of the local politician is worth less money if they regard his work as less important or less difficult than the work done by politicians at other levels. In any case, the pressure from taxpayers to keep salaries low may be more influential at the local level because of the greater frequency of local elections.

Among the politicians in our survey, there is disagreement about the level of remuneration. A small group believes that salaries should deliberately be kept low. Several politicians argued that those who cannot earn a living (on the side) do not have the ability to run a large urban municipality. In fact, according to one borough politician, the pay should be a token \$1.00 a year. Members of this group offered several arguments to support their point of view. One councillor, who suggested that salaries ought to be reduced, argued that high pay attracts opportunists rather than those genuinely interested in serving their community. Another said that, in order to justify their high pay, aldermen are getting involved in matters that are not their responsibility and are doing the work of civil servants. Several councillors were opposed to high salaries because they encourage aldermen to work full-time at their council job; according to this group, politicians who give up their outside income also forfeit some of their independence.

It was more common for politicians to argue that present salaries are too low. Although in at least one municipality the pay gap between mayor and controllers is con-

*In all cases, remuneration is a combination of salary and expense allowance. Salary accounts for two-thirds of the amount and is subject to normal income tax; the other one-third is a tax-free expense allowance.

sidered too great, most of the dissatisfaction is with aldermanic salaries. One alderman described his pay as 'starvation wages' and another called his salary 'ridiculously low', especially in view of the onerous responsibilities of local politicians. Among those who argued in favour of higher pay, some suggested that the salaries should be high enough to allow politicians to work full-time on their council jobs, while others argued that the salaries should be increased but not so high that local public office becomes a full-time job. Many councillors suggested that their salaries should increase automatically with increases in the cost of living. Another proposal was that aldermen should be paid on a sliding scale according to the size of constituency and other factors affecting workload. One politician took the opposite approach and recommended that salaries for aldermen should be the same in all area municipalities.

There was also some concern about the expense portion of their remuneration. Several councillors suggested that the expense allowance be increased because of rising costs. One alderman estimates that he drives about 3,200 miles a year on municipal business and argued that his expense allowance is no longer adequate, particularly in view of increased gas costs. Another politician favoured the elimination of the tax-free allowance and proposed that expenses become tax-deductible instead.

Although many politicians were concerned about their salaries, most of them saw the mechanism for deciding the level of pay as the real problem. It was often argued that the municipal council should not have responsibility for establishing salaries, because, in reacting to selective public pressure, it does not provide appropriate salary increases. One councillor blamed the press which, he argued, has intimidated the smaller councils to the point where they will not raise their salaries. Another argued that, because councillors underpay themselves, their families suffer; he suggested that politicians' families sacrifice enough in the way of privacy without having to bear some financial hardship as well.

There were many suggestions for new mechanisms to establish rates of pay. Some argued that a joint committee of citizens and politicians could do the job. One suggestion was that the province should set salaries on a scale according to population, with the base established through an independent study. Another councillor proposed that salaries be set by an outside committee, made up of members of the Labour Council, Board of Trade, Association of Women Electors, and the Confederation of Resident and Ratepayer Associations. There was one suggestion that The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto make salary recommendations in its final report.

Other politicians rejected these approaches and argued that municipal councils should retain the power to set salaries. Their suggestions were variations on the general theme that the council should vote for an increase at the end of its term in office, to become effective following the election. This would make salary an election issue and would allow the voting electorate as a whole (rather than the press or the 'vociferous few') to make a judgement on the proposed increase.

It is evident from this discussion that salary is an important issue for many local politicians. The following tables give the figures that are at the centre of the dispute.

AVERAGE FOR ALL MUNICIPALITIES \$18,548			
AVERAGE BY POSITION		AVERAGE BY MUNICIPALITY (all elected representatives)	
Mayors	\$37,998	Toronto	\$25,300
		East York	10,992
Controllers/ Executive Aldermen	29,216	Etobicoke	16,861
		North York	19,263
Aldermen	13,648	Scarborough	18,200
		York	16,518

TABLE 4.1 AVERAGE REMUNERATION*

The average pay for serving in local public office in Metropolitan Toronto is \$18,548, but this varies substantially depending on council position and municipality. The distribution by council position follows the expected pattern, with mayors being the most highly paid. Aldermen are the lowest paid members of local councils and, on average, they receive less than half the amount paid to controllers or executive aldermen, and slightly above one-third the salary given to mayors. There is considerable variation among municipalities. As in other variables, Toronto is highest in salary and East York is lowest, and the other four boroughs fall in the middle of the continuum.

This picture changes slightly if we compare salaries for Metro councillors and non-Metro (i.e., local only) councillors by municipality, as in Table 4.2.

* Figures are based on standard salary and expenses for local and Metro work but, where applicable, additional amounts as committee chairman, planning board member, etc. have been included.

METRO COUNCILLORS		NON-METRO COUNCILLORS
Toronto	\$30,888	\$18,114
East York	21,202	8,075
Etobicoke	29,648	10,468
North York	25,666	13,500
Scarborough	27,733	13,000
York	30,873	11,135
Overall Average \$28,196		\$12,360

TABLE 4.2 AVERAGE REMUNERATION FOR METRO AND NON-METRO COUNCILLORS, BY MUNICIPALITY

There are several points to keep in mind when examining these figures. Remuneration for Metro service is uniform throughout the Metropolitan municipality; i.e., all members of Metro council receive \$6,000, and members of Metro executive an additional \$4,000. Furthermore, most members of Metro council are mayors, controllers, or executive aldermen and therefore receive relatively high salaries for their local responsibilities. All of the non-Metro councillors are aldermen.

It is clear from this table that, whatever their perceptions of the job, Toronto aldermen are given substantially greater encouragement (in terms of money) to treat their council jobs as full-time. In a later section of this report, we shall see that only in Toronto do a majority of aldermen actually work full-time at their municipal duties. Almost all of the borough aldermen receive salaries that are in the lower half of this pay scale (i.e., the midpoint of the scale is \$13,094; all borough aldermen except those in North York have salaries below the midpoint, while North York aldermen are only slightly above).

Among Metro councillors, the distribution is more balanced. The midpoint of this scale is \$26,045; four municipalities are above the midpoint and two are below. One point to remember is that in some municipalities (e.g., North York and Toronto), a substantial number of the Metro councillors are aldermen. Another point is that, because all Metro salaries are equal, the general rule is that the higher the salary, the smaller the proportion contributed by Metro remuneration. But it is not clear that those receiving a small proportion of their income from Metro devote a correspondingly small proportion of their time to Metro affairs. As we have suggested earlier, the time that is devoted to Metro affairs is, in general, the time that can be spared from local responsibilities.

Several of the important issues involved in salary cannot be solved by research into such matters as workload. There are prior decisions to be made about whether public office should or should not be treated as a full-time job and about whether candidates should treat being of service to the community as its own reward or whether they should expect a (more or less) normal salary. In making these decisions, one of the primary considerations is whether we regard it as important to make arrangements that allow the 'ordinary working person' to run for public office and, if we do, what effect this choice will have on the other issues. The answers to these questions will provide the basic guidelines for decisions about salary. Once they are settled, the level of remuneration becomes if not an easy problem, at least a more manageable one.

The subject of resources involves the adequacy of office facilities, secretarial assistance, and research help. All three affect the councillor's ability to organize his council, committee, and constituency work in a way that suits him. The availability or absence of such resources will also influence the pressures put on a politician's private job or his home life.

Although the question of resources is of pressing concern to some politicians, the majority appear to find existing arrangements satisfactory. Table 4.3 shows the breakdown for office facilities.

MUNICIPALITY	PRIVATE			SHARED			NONE		
		OK	NOT OK*		OK	NOT OK*		OK	NOT OK*
Toronto	16	14	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
East York	1	-	1	1	-	1	7	2	-
Etobicoke	5	5	-	10	8	2	-	-	-
North York	5	5	-	14	8	6	-	-	-
Scarborough	17	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
York	3	3	-	1	-	1	7	4	2
Subtotal	47	44	2	26	16	10	14	6	2

TABLE 4.3 OFFICE FACILITIES AND THEIR ADEQUACY, BY MUNICIPALITY

* In cases where rows do not add, missing cases are those who did not answer. In the last column, many did not consider the question 'Is your office adequate?' an applicable one.

Almost all of the politicians who have private offices find them satisfactory; the two complaints were both that the office is too small. The aldermanic offices in Scarborough are 'open-concept' cubicles; although politicians consider them acceptable, they expressed some concern about the availability of meeting rooms to use when constituents have private matters to discuss. Among those who share offices, there was less satisfaction, particularly in North York where the offices are considered rather small for two people to share. Aldermen in York and East York are not assigned offices, though in each municipality, one person considered the 'common room' as an office. At least in York, most aldermen do not object to not having offices. We should mention that at least 20 politicians mentioned that they use their business offices for conducting municipal business. Some of them remarked that they found this a very good arrangement and would continue it, even if better facilities were available to them at the municipal headquarters.

The picture is much the same on the subject of secretarial assistance*. (See Table 4.4). All of those with private secretaries said they had adequate assistance. Among those who share the services of one or more secretaries with their colleagues, a majority found the arrangement satisfactory. Those who said it did not work well argued that a few of their colleagues overworked the secretaries, asking them to deal with non-essential work and matters that the aldermen should be able to do themselves on the telephone. In East York, aldermen have no regular secretarial help, but they can ask the Clerk's staff for assistance. Most of them find this a satisfactory arrangement. Once again, however, we should note that a number of aldermen ask the secretaries in their business offices to do some municipal work with the result that they are able to make fewer demands on municipal staff.

MUNICIPALITY	PRIVATE	SHARED		NONE	
		OK	NOT OK	OK	NOT OK
Toronto	15	15	-	1	-
East York	1	1	-	-	-
Etobicoke	-	-	-	15	13
North York	1	1	-	18	9
Scarborough	1	1	-	16	11
York	3	3	-	8	4
Subtotal	21	21	-	58	38

TABLE 4.4 SECRETARIAL ASSISTANCE AND ADEQUACY, BY MUNICIPALITY

*We wish to emphasize that councillors were discussing how much assistance is available to them. Their comments are not a reflection on the abilities of any secretary or research assistant, and should not be construed as a reflection on the competence of municipal staff.

Relatively few municipal politicians have research assistance, and most of them say they do not require any, at least not on a regular basis. The relevant figures are given in Table 4.5.

MUNICIPALITY	REGULAR RESEARCH ASSISTANCE				
	Yes	No	Do you require any?		
			Private	Shared	None
Toronto	9	7	1	-	6
East York	-	9	-	4	5
Etobicoke	5	10	1	3	6
North York	1	18	1	7	10
Scarborough	1	16	-	4	12
York	-	11	1	6	4
TOTAL	16	71	4	24	43

TABLE 4.5 AVAILABILITY OF AND NEED FOR RESEARCH HELP, BY MUNICIPALITY

Only in Toronto do a majority of municipal councillors have regular research help. We should note, however, that most of them are expected to pay research assistants out of their salary and/or expense allowance. Some of those who do not have a regular assistant mentioned that they prefer to hire a person for short term projects (6-8 weeks), rather than employ a full-time researcher. In Scarborough, neither the controllers nor the aldermen have a personal research staff. But the Borough does have a Resource Centre, run by the Clerk's Department, that is able to provide research services for these councillors. Many of them said that the Resource Centre was a satisfactory solution for their research requirements.

It is interesting that a majority of municipal politicians do not perceive a need for regular research assistance. Most of them said that the civic staff was able to provide them with the information they need. In East York, several councillors also mentioned that ratepayers' groups had done valuable research. Among the others, the most common reasons for wanting research help were an interest in investigating subjects for which the civic staff is not responsible (e.g., Metro business, approaches taken in other municipalities), the need to collect 'political' information to support a position opposed to that taken by the staff or other councillors, or the need for help in dealing with constituency problems. In most cases, councillors thought they could share research services with their colleagues. But some of those who do not need a full-time research assistant said that it would be difficult for one person to do research for several councillors, because of their conflicting political views.

In general, there is reasonable satisfaction with available resources. However, this assessment, especially of office facilities and secretarial help, is influenced by whether the councillors treat their job as full- or part-time and by their use of private (i.e. business) facilities in lieu of municipal facilities. Among those who work at their council jobs full-time, the need for municipal resources is generally perceived to be greater.

PART FIVE: ELECTION FINANCING*

Our respondents were asked a series of questions about their campaigns in the December 1974 municipal elections, including how much they spent and how much they received in campaign contributions. From our discussions with former politicians before the survey, we were concerned that respondents might refuse to answer if our questions asked for exact information on campaign finances. To avoid a high refusal rate and yet still acquire some information on election spending, we used less pointed questions. We asked for the *range* of campaign costs (e.g., between \$5,000 and \$10,000) and for the *percentage* of campaign expenses financed by outside contributions, rather than for actual amounts.

As it turned out, our respondents were far more willing to provide us with exact information than we had anticipated. Of the 87 politicians, roughly 75% volunteered specific financial data. This information would have been valuable in any case, but it became especially useful when we realized that our spending categories were not precise enough to convey important distinctions in campaign costs among municipalities. In the following discussion, we use both the 'approximate' information acquired through our questions, and the specific information volunteered by our respondents. There are shortcomings in both types, which affect the way we use the information. The requested data are complete but not as informative as we had hoped; this type of information is used to describe the distributions among the total population of 87 politicians. On the other hand, the volunteered data are far more informative but, because not all 87 councillors are represented, this information is used as a supplement and, where possible, to discuss characteristics that cannot be described through an examination of the approximate data.

There are two further points. The highest cost category we used was 'between \$25,000 and \$30,000' but no one chose that category. In fact, only one person answered that his campaign costs were in the \$20,000 to \$25,000 range; to avoid identifying this respondent, we have combined that category with the one below it so that, in the following tables, the highest category is 'over \$15,000'. The second point is that there appears to be a pattern in the volunteering of specific information. There was a greater tendency for volunteering exact figures among those with relatively low campaign costs. It is likely that this was in response to our categories, which might have been considered appropriate by those who spent relatively large amounts but did not offer enough variation for those at the lower end of the scale (i.e., among those with low costs, a difference of \$2,000 or \$3,000 was much more important than it was among those with high costs).

*In this section of the report, aldermen and executive aldermen are treated as one group, because all are elected at the ward level. In most other sections of the study, executive aldermen are included with controllers, because they have the same local executive responsibilities.

The graph below (Figure 5A) shows the distribution of campaign spending for all politicians in Metropolitan Toronto. As it demonstrates, more than half the local politicians say they spend less than \$5,000 to get elected and only 8 (less than 10%) spent more than \$15,000.

But, as we noted earlier, 79.3% of those elected in 1974 were incumbents. Although in all cases included in this discussion the election was contested, there were some elections where the incumbents faced only frivolous opponents. For these reasons, the 1974 election costs may be quite low. Certainly they are lower than 1972 election costs*.

Frequency




FIGURE 5A CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN METROPOLITAN TORONTO**

This graph presents a clear picture of the weaknesses in our campaign spending categories. Because more than 50% of the cases fall into the first category, it is apparent that finer distinctions are required at the lower end of the scale. This graph is very useful for presenting the overall distribution, but problems arise when we try to examine possible relationships between campaign spending and other variables such as constituency size and municipality. This problem is exemplified in Table 5.1 below.

*One respondent who is elected at large said that he spent about twice as much to get elected in 1972 as in 1974.

**N=85 because in two cases (both in Scarborough) the election was not contested; these respondents have been excluded from the graph.

	Toronto	East York	Etobicoke	North York	Scarborough	York
Under \$5,000	18.8%	88.9%	73.3%	63.2%	80.0%	72.7%
5,001-10,000	56.3	11.1	20.0	21.1	6.7	0.0
10,001-15,000	18.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.7	9.1
Over \$15,000	6.3	0.0	6.7	15.8	6.7	18.2
TOTAL	100.2 (N=16)	100.0 (N=9)	100.0 (N=15)	100.1 (N=19)	100.1 (N=15)	100.0 (N=11)

TABLE 5.1 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CAMPAIGN COSTS WITHIN EACH MUNICIPALITY

One obvious feature of this table is the contrast between the City of Toronto and the boroughs. Toronto is the only municipality where a majority of politicians spent more than \$5,000 on their election campaigns. In all the boroughs, at least 60% of councillors spent less than \$5,000. But the more important point is that, because so many borough politicians fall into the 'under \$5,000' category, we cannot examine what, if any, differences occur among these municipalities. Our breakdown simply does not provide a way of measuring the inter-borough differences. It was in response to this problem that we decided to make use of the specific information volunteered by our respondents.

Inter-municipal differences in campaign spending can most reliably be examined among aldermen (including executive aldermen), because 83% of them supplied specific data. Table 5.2 provides average campaign costs for aldermen in each municipality.

MUNICIPALITY	AVERAGE CAMPAIGN COST	PERCENTAGE OF ALDERMEN INCLUDED
Toronto	\$8,075	80%*
East York	761	75
Etobicoke	2,755	90
North York	3,046	93
Scarborough	3,488	75
York	1,566	36
OVER ALL	\$3,878	83%

TABLE 5.2 AVERAGE CAMPAIGN COST FOR ALDERMEN, BY MUNICIPALITY

*This figure represents the percentage of those actually surveyed. In the case of Toronto, 12 aldermen or 80% are included. But if the 7 aldermen who did not participate in the survey are counted, this percentage drops to 55%. It is possible that the six members of the Reform Caucus have relatively low campaign costs. If so, the true Toronto average might be considerably lower than the figure we have given. If all six spent \$3,000 (the lowest amount mentioned for Toronto), the average would drop to \$6,393.

The results in this table do not contradict the information provided in Table 5.1, but they provide a much more precise picture. Assuming that aldermen predominate in the lowest category of campaign spending, we knew from Table 5.1 that Toronto campaign costs were highest. However, this table shows that the average campaign cost for Toronto aldermen is more than double the average cost in any other municipality. Furthermore, we can see that most East York aldermen spend, on average, far less than any other aldermen; they are in a class of their own, having an average campaign cost of less than \$800. The second column of Table 5.2 gives the percentage of aldermen included in the calculation, so that we have a measure of the reliability of the average. In all cases except York, at least three-quarters of the aldermen in the survey are included. This means that most of our average figures are probably not far off the true average. The important exception is the case of York, where our figure may or may not be accurate; with only 36% of the respondents included, there is a substantial degree of uncertainty.

In trying to account for differences in campaign spending, three major explanatory factors can be suggested.

1. CONSTITUENCY SIZE. The underlying imperative of all election campaigns is to reach as many of the voters as possible. Since total cost is probably related to the numbers of voters involved, it is reasonable to argue that the larger the constituency, the higher the campaign cost. However, we must remember that candidates have a considerable measure of discretion and are free to choose among differently-priced methods of reaching their potential constituents.

2. EXPERIENCE IN OFFICE. Those who have served in public office before an election have two important advantages over newcomers: exposure through their official duties (e.g., service to constituents, press coverage) and through their previous election campaigns. We can suggest that those with greater experience would spend less to be re-elected (within certain limits). However, we cannot ignore the important effects of individual variation. For instance, suppose Person A spent \$3,000 to get elected for the first time in 1972 and in his 1974 campaign was able to reduce his costs to \$1,800. Contrast this with Person B, who ran his first election campaign in 1974 on a total of \$1,500. This simple example illustrates that experience in office may have an effect that can only be measured by comparing the same individuals over time, which this study does not do.

3. MUNICIPAL TRADITION. This concept is more nebulous than the others, but it may have important effects. The idea is based on the existence of a certain political style within a municipality that affects the way campaigns are run and how much they cost. The implicit assumption is that successful candidates tend to adhere to the tradition and govern their campaign according to it (within certain limits). For instance, the tradition in one

municipality might involve an emphasis on all candidates' meetings and other public appearances involving little expense, while the pattern in another municipality might depend on signs, media advertising, and other relatively costly methods of reaching the voters. The particular importance of this factor is that it may run counter to the effects of constituency size.

These are the three factors that might account for patterns in campaign spending. However, individual variations may be more important than any of these; that is, the differences among individuals in the way they choose to run their campaigns may be more important in explaining campaign spending than the external influences on constituency size, experience in office, and municipal tradition.

We tried to examine all three factors and to consider the interplay among them. In general, our investigations indicate that constituency size has some importance but only when a certain critical size has been reached; that the effects of experience in office (if any) can only be measured by comparing the same individuals over time; and that municipal tradition is the most important of the three in explaining differences in campaign spending. However, there is some evidence to suggest that individual variations are also very important.

Our conclusions about the influence of constituency size or campaign costs are based on an examination of aldermanic campaigns and the size of wards, and on the comparison between the costs of ward and municipality-wide elections. Table 5.3 presents the average ward size in each municipality (ranked highest to lowest) and the associated average campaign cost.

MUNICIPALITY	AVERAGE SIZE OF WARDS	AVERAGE CAMPAIGN COST
Toronto	62,023	\$8,075
Etobicoke	57,624	2,755
North York	38,833	3,046
Scarborough	30,296	3,488
East York	26,528	716
York	17,550	1,566

TABLE 5.3 AVERAGE WARD SIZE AND AVERAGE COST OF ALDERMANIC CAMPAIGNS, BY MUNICIPALITY

From an examination of this table, we can infer that there is no consistent relationship between constituency size and campaign costs for ward elections. Etobicoke wards are relatively close to Toronto wards in size, but the difference in average campaign costs is dramatic (\$2,755 compared to \$8,075). The difference in size between East York and Scarborough wards is even smaller, yet East York aldermen spend about one-fifth as much as Scarborough aldermen spend, on average. North York wards are 22% larger than Scarborough wards, but North York aldermen spend 14% less on campaigns than their Scarborough counterparts.

These figures tend to support the notion that there are identifiable municipal patterns in campaign spending that are not merely a disguise for the effects of constituency size. Obviously, East York aldermen conduct low budget campaigns; either successful candidates in East York are an exceptionally thrifty group by nature, or campaigning in East York is governed by the municipality's 'political style', which includes modest election campaigns. Similarly, campaigning in Etobicoke is, compared to campaigning in Toronto, a relatively inexpensive activity. Given the similarity in ward sizes, it seems reasonable to suggest that there are different standards at work, standards that reflect the differences in political style in the two municipalities.

It is perhaps possible that these differences in campaign costs, and the suggested differences in political style, are a reflection of the degree of political conflict within the municipalities. We have already discussed the evidence that tends to support the argument that conflict is most intense in Toronto and that consensus is highest in East York, with the other boroughs falling between these two extremes. If this argument can be extended to campaign spending, we would suggest that the cost of campaigns varies according to the intensity of political conflict. However, we must also note that there is probably an important time factor involved; that is, the effects of greater political conflict would not be immediately reflected in higher campaign costs. Instead, it is likely that continued conflict will eventually have its effect. If this is so, then it is difficult in this type of study to identify municipalities in transition; i.e., where the nature of political debate is changing.

We can make one further point about aldermanic campaigns. From the specific data our respondents volunteered, we have the range of campaign costs in each municipality. The minimum amount in each can be treated, with some qualifications, as the entry costs for a successful aldermanic campaign in that municipality. The most important qualifications affecting this assumption are a) because we do not have data for all aldermen, we cannot be sure that our information contains the true minimum for each case, and b) we cannot rule out the possibility that a candidate could successfully campaign for less than the thriftiest of the successful 1974 candidates did. Acknowledging these reservations, we can present the known minima for aldermanic campaigns.

Toronto	\$3,000
East York	500
Etobicoke	1,200
North York	1,000
Scarborough	1,200
York	500

In four municipalities, the candidates spending the minimum were all incumbents and it is possible that the entry costs for a newcomer might be higher. Some of the incumbents included in our survey mentioned that they recycle campaign materials, especially signs, and thus spend less on campaigns after their first. In East York and Scarborough, the minima given here apply to at least one newcomer in each municipality and thus can be considered as entry costs. The pattern seems to be that entry costs are lowest in the two small boroughs, higher (and roughly equal) in the three suburban boroughs, and substantially greater again in Toronto.

Table 5.4 below compares the distribution of campaign costs for ward elections and at large elections. It is obvious, and not surprising, that at large elections tend to be much more expensive.

CAMPAIGN COST	BY WARD	AT LARGE
Under \$5,000	78%	15%
5,001-10,000	17	35
10,001-15,000	5	10
Over \$15,000	0	40
TOTAL	100% (N=65)	100% (N=20)

TABLE 5.4 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CAMPAIGN COSTS, BY METHOD OF ELECTION

This distribution can be explained by several factors. One possibility is that because candidates in at large elections are dealing with much larger constituencies, their costs are correspondingly higher. Spending on items such as house-to-house campaign literature will be greater. While there is a relationship between constituency size per se and campaign spending, it is tempered by individual differences in campaign style and by the economies of scale available to candidates with very large constituencies. The relationship between method of election and campaign spending is considerably stronger. This suggests that there is a qualitative difference in the type of campaign expenses (and their total cost) for the two methods of election. To some extent, this was borne out by comments on election costs offered by our respondents. One politician implied that costs for at large elections do not vary with constituency size after a certain point, and argued that there would be a comparatively small increase in expenses for a candidate in a Metro-wide election. In explaining his argument, he referred to economies of scale and to the greater use of media advertising in at large elections; campaign advertisements cover the whole Metropolitan

municipality, even though the candidate's constituency is only one of the area municipalities*.

Election campaigns are financed through the candidate's own resources or through campaign contributions, or as in most cases, through some combination of the two. Figure 5B gives the distribution of the percentage of campaign costs financed through outside contributions.




FIGURE 5B PERCENTAGE OF ELECTION COSTS FINANCED BY OUTSIDE CONTRIBUTIONS

This graph shows that the distribution among the five categories is approximately equal. Almost as many people had three-quarters or more of their campaign paid for by outside contributions, as financed their campaigns entirely from their own resources.

But it is important to note that all our respondents were successful candidates, and that almost 80% were incumbents. We might expect that they would receive more campaign contributions than the unsuccessful candidates. Certainly incumbents would find it easier to raise funds, but even newcomers, if their chances of winning appeared strong, would have more people willing to contribute to their campaigns. Therefore, throughout this discussion, we should remind readers that the results apply only to successful candidates.

The percentage of expenses financed by contributions varies substantially among different categories of campaign costs and among municipalities. In the following tables, we examine these variations. However, in all cases, we have excluded those respondents who accepted no contributions. These politicians expressed opposition to the principle of campaign contributions, so their numbers have an importance of their own. The average percentages in the following tables are thus based only on politicians who accepted some outside support.

*This is true when radio and television advertising is used, or when candidates advertise in any of the three daily papers with Metro-wide circulation. It does not apply when advertisements are placed in local weeklies.

CAMPAIGN COST	AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTIONS	NUMBER INCLUDED
Under \$5,000	44.1%	37
5,001-10,000	53.1	17
10,001-15,000	69.8	5
Over \$15,000	56.1	7

TABLE 5.5 AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF CONTRIBUTION, BY CATEGORY OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING

This table indicates that those with higher campaign costs received proportionately more outside support, except in the 'most expensive campaign' category. However, this does not mean, necessarily, that the absolute amount of contributions is distributed in the same way. For instance, if we assume that the average cost of the \$10,001-15,000 category was \$12,500, the average contributions might be assumed to be \$8,725. If we assume that the average cost in the 'over \$15,000' category was \$17,500, the average in contributions might be assumed to be \$9,818. Although one group received proportionately more in contributions than the other, the absolute amount was lower. It is also important to note that the numbers refusing contributions were much higher among those with relatively low campaign costs. In fact, of the 19 politicians who refused contributions, 17 of them spent less than \$5,000, one spent between \$5,000 and 10,000, and one spent between \$15,000 and 20,000. It is not surprising that the numbers are distributed in this way, because financing an expensive campaign entirely out of one's own resources can represent considerable financial hardship.

Table 5.6 presents the average percentage of contributions within each municipality. Again these percentages are based on only the politicians who accepted donations; this is particularly important where, as in East York, two-thirds did not accept contributions. The final category in this table shows the adjusted percentages (i.e. the averages include both those who accepted some contributions and those who refused).

MUNICIPALITY	AVERAGE PERCENTAGE AMONG THOSE ACCEPTING CONTRIBUTIONS	AVERAGE PERCENTAGE ADJUSTED
Toronto	64.1%	64.1%
East York	32.2	10.8
Etobicoke	35.5	30.4
North York	57.4	48.4
Scarborough	39.4	29.6
York	45.9	29.2

TABLE 5.6 AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF CONTRIBUTIONS, BY MUNICIPALITY

We can see from this table that Toronto politicians received the highest proportion of their expenses from campaign contributions. Comparing the percentage and adjusted percentage shows that they are identical; i.e., none of the Toronto councillors refused to accept contributions. Among the other municipalities, there were some who refused contributions in every case. These two columns are useful because the first tells us the proportion of expenses financed by contributions among those who accepted them and the second gives a measure of the importance of campaign contributions in each municipality. Therefore, while a York councillor who accepts campaign support is likely to get proportionately more than his Scarborough counterpart, campaign contributions have about the same impact, overall in the two municipalities.

The actual amounts involved depend, of course, on the campaign costs involved. Using the specific data supplied by our respondents and examining aldermanic campaigns only, we give the figures in Table 5.7.

MUNICIPALITY	ACCEPTING CONTRIBUTIONS		REFUSING CONTRIBUTIONS
	AVERAGE AMT. CONTRIBUTION	NO. INVOLVED	NO. INVOLVED
Toronto	\$5,876	12	0
East York	100	2	4
Etobicoke	834	7	2
North York	2,203	10	3
Scarborough	1,007	7	2
York*	1,500	1	2

TABLE 5.7** AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION TO ALDERMANIC CAMPAIGN, BY MUNICIPALITY

The average contributions in this table must be treated with some caution, because not all the aldermen are included in the calculations. The Toronto figures are based on twelve aldermen, slightly more than half. This represents 80% of those who participated in the survey, but does not include any of the members of the Reform Caucus. The true average for Toronto might be quite different: it would vary only slightly if the members of the Reform Caucus do not accept campaign contributions, but could differ substantially if their contributions were small***.

*Results for York may be quite unreliable because only 3 of the 8 aldermen supplied exact data, and of them, only one accepted contributions.
 **Numbers are based on those volunteering specific information.
 ***To illustrate the point, if members of the Reform Caucus had average contributions of \$100 each (in total), the Toronto average for those accepting contributions would drop to \$3,951.

The importance of campaign contributions is that they reduce the personal financial burden to the politician. Although our data are not complete, we can offer some information on the personal costs borne by *successful* candidates. These figures should not be treated as true averages because so many cases are missing but at least they can be used to indicate the costs among a certain group.

MUNICIPALITY	AVERAGE CAMPAIGN COST AMONG THOSE ACCEPTING CONTRIBUTIONS	AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION	AVERAGE NET COST
Toronto	\$8,075	\$5,876	\$2,199
East York	750	100	650
Etobicoke	2,328	834	1,494
North York	3,610	2,203	1,407
Scarborough	3,057	1,007	2,050

TABLE 5.8* AVERAGE CAMPAIGN FINANCES AMONG THOSE ACCEPTING CONTRIBUTIONS, BY MUNICIPALITY

Despite the important limitation of this table (i.e., the number of missing cases), it is useful for illustrating that, at least among those who supplied us with specific information and accepted campaign contributions, the variation among municipalities in net costs to aldermanic candidates is surprisingly small. Both the average campaign cost given in Table 5.2** and the average total of contributions given in Table 5.7 show considerable variation among municipalities. Yet, when the two are taken together, the differences are much smaller. In general, it takes between \$650 and \$2,200 of one's own resources to run for aldermanic office in these five municipalities. The average net cost is quite low in East York, but it is approximately the same in the other municipalities, where the range is from \$1,407 in North York to \$2,199 in Toronto.

Most of this discussion has concentrated on aldermanic campaigns, because our detailed information deals with a greater proportion of aldermen. We can offer some information about those elected at large, but only in a general way. Among mayors, the average proportion of campaign costs financed by contributions was 68.2%, while among controllers,

*York has been excluded because only one case would have been given.

**Note that average campaign cost in Table 5.2 and in Table 5.8 differs. This is because the averages in Table 5.8 have been based on the campaign costs of those accepting donations only.

the average was 32.2%*. All of the mayors accepted campaign contributions, but three controllers refused them, and one could not estimate the percentage of his costs financed by contributions. It is perhaps not surprising that mayors received, proportionately, more than twice as much of their costs from contributions as controllers did. Mayors are more visible than controllers, especially because of their symbolic importance as heads of the municipalities, and they usually face fewer opponents in the election (i.e., they have access to a greater share of the potential contributions to mayoralty campaigns).

Our respondents made many recommendations about elections and election financing. Perhaps the most common was that elections should be held every three years instead of every two years. This was usually proposed because a longer term would allow more time for the regular conduct of municipal business (i.e., orientation and end-of-term electioneering would take up proportionately less time) and would encourage longer term planning. However, some politicians also said that election every three years would save money for the candidates and for the municipality, which bears the administrative expense of elections. Many councillors recommended that candidates should have to post a bond and that nomination papers should be required to have the signature of more constituents. Both these proposals are intended to cut down on the number of frivolous candidates.

There is no agreement among municipal politicians on the issue of taxpayer support for election campaigns. Many argued in favour of some support, in the form of a per voter grant, tax-deductible donations, or municipally-financed election literature. Others were vehemently opposed to public support and many of them argued that any candidate who cannot finance a campaign does not have the ability to serve on council. On the issue of public disclosure of campaign finances, many politicians gave their qualified support. Only a few opposed disclosure in principle, but many argued that the names of contributors should not be made public, because it discourages potential contributors. About 25% of municipal politicians favour a limit on campaign spending, possibly based on the size of the constituency. A number of others favour limitations on the size, number and location of campaign signs but an equally large group supports a total ban on signs which, they argue, are a form of environmental pollution.

*Percentage is based on the 10 who accepted contributions and could estimate the proportion. Note that only controllers are involved here; executive aldermen have been grouped with aldermen.

In general, our election data show that there are important differences among municipalities in the cost of election campaigns, and that at large campaigns are significantly more expensive than ward campaigns. Our figures show that a majority of aldermen can run campaigns for less than \$4,000 but these and other financial statistics reflect the fact that about 80% of the 1974 winners were incumbents, whose campaign costs are lower. Our data on campaign contributions, though based on figures reported by successful candidates whose contributions may be higher than average, suggest that outside support is an important factor in reducing inter-municipal disparities in the costs of running for public office.

PART SIX: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OCCUPATIONS

The private occupations of municipal councillors are considered relevant to local politics for two main reasons. First of all, being in municipal politics is, at best, an uncertain career*, and those engaged in it will want to safeguard their private job prospects as much as possible. Given this concern, there may be an occupational bias among local politicians in favour of occupations that allow people greater control over their present and future job activities. Furthermore, such a bias, if one exists, can influence the councils' ability to reflect the range of interests and perspectives within their constituencies. Another reason for our interest involves not the private occupations per se, but the combination of public and private employment. How many local politicians combine the two jobs? Are there systematic differences between those whose council job is their sole occupation and those who combine it with their private work? If there are, how do we assess the differences? These questions are of special concern in an area like Metropolitan Toronto, where there is a clear division between those who argue that local political office must be treated as a full-time job and those who claim that the combination of public and private work is not only feasible but desirable.

There is another related issue concerning private income. This point is not exactly the same as our concern with private occupation because not all of those with an outside income are actively working at their private jobs; some have unearned income from their own businesses, other investments, etc. Examining private income will first of all identify how many local politicians actually have other financial resources and it may also help, either directly or by implication, to assess the adequacy of remuneration for local public service.

Figure 6A presents the distribution of private occupations among politicians in Metropolitan Toronto.

*Political careers at all levels of government are uncertain, but the problem may be more severe at the local level because of the greater frequency of elections.

**These two categories are treated separately in an effort to distinguish between those employees who are likely to have greater control over their working time (managerial) and those who are more likely to be subject to specific company regulations regarding the hours they work and so on (employed in firm). The latter has been treated as the residual category.

+The category 'NONE' refers to those with no formal private occupation; i.e., either retired or housewives.

Frequency




FIGURE 6A DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE OCCUPATIONS
(Footnotes appear on page 65)

The interesting feature of this distribution is the predominance of the 'independent' occupations where people are able to establish their own hours or at least have considerable control over when and how they work. The largest category, independent business, includes both small one-man firms and larger companies owned (either alone or in partnership) and/or managed by the local politician. Although these enterprises might be significantly different in many respects, we can assume that they share the characteristic of allowing the politician to work part-time if he chooses and of assuring him a reasonably secure job future when he leaves public office. Many of the other occupations can be assumed to offer a similar flexibility, either for part-time work (e.g. insurance) or for comparatively easy re-entry (e.g. law and teaching), or both.

We were interested in exploring these assumptions, and we asked our respondents whether their occupations would allow part-time work and whether they are easy occupations to re-enter. In a majority of cases, our respondents answered that their occupations do offer this sort of flexibility. The results are presented in Table 6.1.

OCCUPATION	Could you work on a part-time basis?		Is your occupation an easy one to return to?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Lawyer	5	3	7	1
Accountant	3	1	1	3
Teacher	2	4	6	0
Other Professional	10	4	12	2
Insurance	4	1	4	1
Managerial	8	1	8	1
Real Estate	2	1	3	0
Independent Business*	14	3	14	2
Employed in Firm	3	3	2	4
TOTAL	51	21	57	14

TABLE 6.1**OCCUPATION AND ASSESSMENT OF JOB FLEXIBILITY

*One person could not answer the second question.

**Those with no outside occupation (i.e. housewives and retired persons) have been excluded. We should note, however, that two of the housewives said that it would not be easy to return to full time housework. In one case, the woman's family now requires the second income and she would seek other employment if she no longer held her council job. The other woman said that after her council job she would find housework too dull.

Dealing with the part-time issue first, the table shows that in all but two occupations, a majority of politicians *could* work at their jobs on a part-time basis. The two exceptions are teaching, where four out of six said they could not work part-time and the residual category of employment in a firm, where three said it was possible for them and three said it was not. Over all, a clear majority (71%) could work part-time. All of our respondents were able to give us a straight yes or no answer, and many of them explained their reasons. Among those NOT able to work part-time, several said that they had been able to combine their council and private jobs when they were aldermen but could no longer do so in their present positions as mayors or controllers. Another person explained that he had continued council work with his private job for about six months after his election, but it created problems that eventually led his union to insist that he resign from one position or the other.

Among those who could work part-time, the majority of explanations began 'Yes, I could, but...'. Most of them said that either their private occupation suffered or their council job suffered. Those employed in a firm said that they were able to work part-time with some tolerance on the part of their employers; one person explained that the company does not like the situation but has so far put up with it. In two cases where the councillors hold managerial positions, they said that their companies encouraged public involvement such as theirs, though one of them added that his firm supported it because it is *non-partisan* community involvement. Another respondent explained that working part-time creates some difficulties for him, but that he believes it is important, in principle, to have an outside job; he argued that those who work only at their council jobs tend to lose touch with people and are less realistic. This was a fairly common theme among those who combine their public and private occupations.

On the question of returning to one's occupation after serving in office, an even greater majority (80%) said that they would find it quite easy. Again, there was a majority in all but two of the occupational categories. The exceptions in this question were accountants and those employed in firms. The accountants explained that frequent and important changes in the tax laws meant that they were out of date because of their time away from their profession*. One of them estimated that he would have to spend about \$5,000 to catch up. In the 'employed' category, the more common explanation was that their time away from the job put them at a competitive disadvantage and even if they did return, they would be (as one respondent

*We should remind readers that although 3 of the 4 accountants answered yes to the part-time question, their answers mean that they could work part-time, not that they actually do so.

put it) 'at the botton of the heap'. For those in other occupations, difficulty in re-entering their private jobs was related to the length of time they had been away. In one case where the politician owns his own business, he has had to make arrangements for it to be run in his absence; his return after a number of years away would cause considerable disruption. Other respondents mentioned the loss of their business contacts and the gradual reduction in their clientele as the main reasons why their return to private life would be difficult. As one person put it, 'the opportunity costs of serving in public office are extremely high.'

Those who would find it easy to return mentioned many of the same concerns but were able to give a qualified 'yes' to the question. Almost all of them indicated that some sacrifices would be involved, though in general those owning their own businesses (especially in partnership) and those who continued to work part-time were more optimistic. Several respondents argued that ensuring an easy return to their private occupations very important because it makes their council jobs easier; i.e., they have greater political freedom of action because they are not dependent on their council income as their sole source of future financial security. Only one respondent said he would be in a better position in his private job after serving on council; in his managerial job, 'public service enhances private prospects' partly because his firm sees it as a character-building activity.

In general, when they were questioned directly on the subject, our respondents indicated a high degree of concern about job security. If this issue is a salient one even among those whose future prospects are, by their own estimation, quite good, it is easy to see that the possible job costs of seeking office for those in less flexible occupations would be high and, in many cases, prohibitive.

Several of those presently holding public office argued that 'municipal politics is too much the domain of the white collar classes' and expressed some concern that the ordinary working person cannot get the extra time off to serve in office, even though he is interested and has a great deal to offer.

Some politicians suggested that special severance pay or a municipal pension might improve the situation, but such proposals are not likely to receive a sympathetic hearing, given the current climate of financial restraints. There is no easy solution to this problem. Nonetheless, it is, at the least, unfortunate that those who choose to serve in public office should face (as in some cases) substantial hardship for having done so.

We should point out that our discussion deals with only *successful* candidates for local public office. It is possible, but unlikely, that unsuccessful candidates hold private jobs that offer fewer opportunities for part-time work or poorer prospects for future job security. The nature of a candidate's job is rarely an election issue and voters are unlikely to distinguish between candidates on this basis. However, we should point out that the voter's choice is sometimes made simply because of the familiarity of the candidate's name. This gives incumbents an advantage and it may also favour those in occupations that bring them into the public eye. Thus the owner of a local retail business is better-known, and perhaps more likely to be a successful candidate, than a computer programmer or an X-ray technician. But this point does not bear directly on the issue of job flexibility, and we still maintain the argument that candidacy (successful or not) and flexible occupation go together.

One common theme in our discussions was that working part-time while in office makes future work prospects much brighter. The following table gives the distribution by municipality of those who actually do combine their public and private jobs; we have adjusted the figures so that those who do not have a private job (i.e. those who are retired or are housewives) are included only in the bracketed figures. Among the 72 politicians who have private occupations, 42 of them (58.3%) combine their public responsibilities and their private work. When we include all those who work full-time at their council jobs (those with an outside occupation and those without), we can see that politicians who spend all their working time on municipal affairs are, in fact, a majority (51.7%).

MUNICIPALITY	COUNCIL JOB ONLY		COMBINED COUNCIL AND PRIVATE JOB
Toronto	(13)	11	3
East York	(5)	2	4
Etobicoke	(7)	3	8
North York	(8)	5	11
Scarborough	(8)	7	9
York	(4)	2	7
TOTAL	(45)	30	42

TABLE 6.2 PUBLIC OCCUPATION AND COMBINED PUBLIC/PRIVATE OCCUPATIONS, BY MUNICIPALITY

Toronto is the only municipality where politicians who devote all their time to council work are in the majority, whether those without another occupation are included or not. In all the boroughs except East York, the reverse is true; i.e., those combining public and private work are in the majority, whichever way we look at it.

We saw from Table 6.1 that a solid majority of politicians believe their occupations are flexible enough for part-time work. Therefore, we might conclude that it is more likely to be the nature of their public responsibilities, not their private occupations, that distinguishes those whose full time is devoted to council work from the others. Table 6.3 below supports that conclusion.

COUNCIL POSITION	COUNCIL JOB ONLY	COUNCIL AND PRIVATE JOBS
Mayor	5	1
Controller/Executive Alderman	16	2
Alderman	24	39
TOTAL	45	42

TABLE 6.3 PUBLIC OCCUPATION AND COMBINED PUBLIC/PRIVATE OCCUPATIONS, BY COUNCIL POSITION

Almost 93% of those who combine their council work and private job are aldermen who, unlike mayors and controllers (including executive aldermen), have no executive responsibilities.

One of the obvious questions is whether those who only work at their council job spend more time on it, in an absolute sense, than their colleagues who hold two jobs. Because the workload for mayors and controllers is greater than for aldermen, and because most of those combining two jobs are aldermen, the following comparisons are based only on the hours put in by aldermen in each municipality. Table 6.4 compares the total workload of sole-occupation and two-occupation aldermen.

MUNICIPALITY	AVERAGE LENGTH OF COUNCIL WORK WEEK	
	ALDERMEN WITH NO OTHER JOB	ALDERMEN WITH PRIVATE JOB
Toronto	61.9	50.0
East York	39.6	27.3
Etobicoke	42.7	37.7
North York	53.3	36.1
Scarborough	58.7	43.8

TABLE 6.4* AVERAGE LENGTH OF COUNCIL WORK WEEK FOR ALDERMEN, SOLE OCCUPATION AND COMBINED OCCUPATIONS, BY MUNICIPALITY

*York has been excluded because only one alderman has council job as sole occupation.

There is a systematic difference between the two groups. In every municipality, aldermen who hold two jobs tend to spend less time on their council work, on average, than their single-occupation colleagues. But how should we assess this difference? The debate over full- vs. part-time council work raises a number of issues. One side argues that those who hold two jobs must be doing a less-than-adequate job fulfilling their council responsibilities, while the contrary argument is that councillors with two jobs use their time more efficiently and/or spend less time on matters tangential to their council responsibilities. In evaluating their performances, one side argues that those who maintain their private occupation are in closer touch with the average constituent and have a more realistic perspective on matters of public concern. One of our respondents maintained that full-time politicians 'have too big a stake in the system and their judgement is unreasonably affected by small pressure groups and lobbies'. But the contrary argument is that those who spend all their time on council affairs have more time to study the issues before council and have a better first-hand knowledge of them. At the risk of appearing to avoid the issue, we can only say that the arguments of both sides may have some truth. It is true* that those with two jobs spend less time on their council work, but we do not have the evidence to conclude that this fact bespeaks a systematic difference between the two groups in the calibre of their council work.

An examination of other differences between them illustrates the difficulty. Table 6.5 compares single-occupation aldermen and two-occupation aldermen on three other dimensions: average preparation for council meetings, average preparation for committee meetings and average time spent dealing with constituents' problems. These three variables have been chosen because they all involve a measure of discretion on the part of the councillors. An alderman cannot decide how long the council meeting will be, but he can decide how much time he will spend preparing for it.

*True within limits. We should remind readers that figures are based on the politicians' own perceptions of time spent. It is possible that those with two jobs tend to underestimate their council work when compared to those who work only at their council job.

MUNICIPALITY	AVERAGE COUNCIL PREP'N (Hrs/Mo)		AVERAGE COMMITTEE PREP'N (Hrs/Mo)		AVERAGE CON- STITUENT TIME (Hrs/Wk)	
	1	2	1	2	1	2
Toronto	9.5	10.7	14.9	13.7	20.4	10.7
East York	9.2	9.7	7.5	9.0	3.6	9.7
Etobicoke	13.7	15.4	7.3	9.7	6.7	9.8
North York	12.3	9.7	7.3	4.1	21.5	11.3
Scarborough	11.0	10.6	5.7	6.6	27.0	15.8

TABLE 6.5* COMPARISON OF COUNCIL PREPARATION, COMMITTEE PREPARATION, AND CONSTITUENCY TIME FOR SINGLE-OCCUPATION AND TWO-OCCUPATION ALDERMEN, BY MUNICIPALITY

If we look closely at these figures, we can see that in three cases there are systematic differences within municipalities, while in the other two the pattern is not so clear. Moreover, this means that among municipalities no clear pattern emerges. In both Toronto and Scarborough, Group 2 aldermen (i.e., those combining two jobs) spend substantially less time with their constituents than Group 1 aldermen. But the time they spend preparing for council and committee meetings is roughly the same. In East York and Etobicoke, Group 2 aldermen spend more time on all of these activities than Group 1 aldermen. But in North York, the situation is exactly the opposite: Group 1 aldermen (i.e., working only at their council job) spend more time preparing for council, preparing for committees and dealing with their constituents than aldermen who work at two jobs (i.e., Group 2).

*The number 1 is used to refer to those who work only at their council job, and 2 to refer to those who work at their council job and private occupation.

We can see from these results that there is no clear pattern among the area municipalities. Even if we could assume that the quality of the performance is related to the hours spent on it, we cannot say that, on balance, one group does a better job than the other. But, as we have pointed out, there are other issues involved in the question of whether politicians should work only at their municipal duties. Many people would argue that, even if councillors who combined public and private work spent less time than the others on every aspect of their council responsibilities, they should be encouraged to continue with their private jobs because it allows them more independence and gives them a different perspective on public issues. Others maintain that council work *must* be treated as a full-time job and that the salary should be set accordingly. One of their arguments is that this would encourage people from a broader range of occupations, particularly from those jobs which do not permit work on a part-time basis, to consider running for public office.

Our respondents were asked if they had any regular income apart from their council pay; if the answer was yes, we asked for the approximate amount of this income. The results are given in Table 6.6.

RANGE OF OUTSIDE INCOME	COUNCILLORS WITHOUT OTHER EMPLOYMENT	COUNCILLORS WITH PRIVATE JOBS
None	17	-
Under \$5,000	12	4
\$5,001-10,000	10	4
\$10,001-15,000	2	8
\$15,001-20,000	-	1
Over \$20,000	2	25
TOTAL	43	42

TABLE 6.6 RANGE OF OUTSIDE INCOME FOR COUNCILLORS WITHOUT OTHER EMPLOYMENT AND COUNCILLORS WITH PRIVATE JOBS

Among those who work only at their council jobs (column one), roughly 40% have no source of income other than their council remuneration. A further 12 councillors (27%) have outside income of less than \$5,000 but, in most cases, it is income from such sources as family allowance, disability pension, etc. and the amount is considerably below \$5,000. About one third of these councillors have outside incomes of more than \$5,000 from investments, business properties, etc. In general

for the majority of councillors who work solely at their municipal jobs, their council remuneration is their sole income or a very high proportion of their total income.

In the group of councillors who combine their council duties and their private jobs, eight (or about 20%) earn an outside income of less than \$10,000. As we have seen earlier, more than 90% of those who work at both public and private occupations are aldermen, for whom the average council pay is \$13,648. Thus, for the eight whose outside earnings are less than \$10,000, it is likely that their council salary is more than half their total income. But almost 60% of those who also work at their private jobs have an outside income of more than \$20,000 a year. For these councillors, outside earnings are much more significant, and constitute a greater proportion of total income than their council pay does.

If we take the distribution of outside earnings among those who continue to work at their private jobs as an indicator of the income that councillors forego when they decide to work solely at their council jobs, we can see that they make a substantial financial sacrifice by their choice. The total earnings (council and private) among those who continue with their private occupations are considerably higher than the total income of those who work solely at their council jobs. However, this deals only with the point of *continuing* with private work or not. An equally important question is 'do politicians make a financial sacrifice if they *leave* their private work to enter public office?'. We cannot address this question, for we do not have information on current incomes in the occupations councillors left. However, we can note that 15 of the 87 councillors in our survey do not have other occupations, so that the question of a financial sacrifice does not arise. But, for about 20% of our respondents who have a private occupation, returning to their private jobs will not be easy and, in these cases, there may be a future sacrifice, even if they suffer no present financial disadvantage because they serve in public office.

Our data on occupations suggest that there is a definite bias in favour of occupations with better-than-average flexibility. Future job security and the level of remuneration for council work are both important in encouraging municipal politicians to continue working at their private jobs. This practice is particularly prevalent among aldermen and in the municipalities where the council workload is roughly equal to a normal work week. Although holding down two jobs creates problems for councillors in their private and public work (and also, we believe, in their personal lives), the sacrifice is worth it to them if they want to maintain their incomes at a level above what their council work pays, and if they want to keep their future job options open.

CONCLUSIONS

In this study, we have tried to provide information that will help us understand the job facing municipal politicians, and that may help in the evaluation of political structures in Metropolitan Toronto. We have examined both the workload borne by councillors in the area municipalities and the obligations involved in serving on Metro council, and we have addressed some of the issues involved in a candidate's decision to run for public office, including election financing and the importance of flexibility in his private occupation.

Our general findings are that serving in local public office involves longer hours than the average private job. Municipal politicians spend, on average, almost fifty hours a week on their council responsibilities. This workload varies among area municipalities and according to council position. Toronto politicians put in the longest work week, while the hours are shortest for councillors in the smallest boroughs, York and East York. Serving in an executive position (mayor, controller, or executive alderman) involves greater responsibilities and longer hours than an aldermanic job, in all the area municipalities.

We have suggested that the amount of work involved in serving in public office is also related to the issues facing the municipality and to the nature of political debate. In municipalities where development or redevelopment issues are particularly important, more work is involved for the councillors, partly because of the time they must devote to their constituents' problems and concerns arising from these issues. At the same time, political debate in some municipalities is now concerned with choices between different values and different philosophies about the nature of the urban community. In others, more of the councillors' time is devoted to the administrative decisions and policy issues common to most urban governments. The two factors are, of course, inter-related. Development and redevelopment involve fundamental questions affecting the future of the municipality and often require lengthy debate before the difficult choices can be made. In built-up areas not yet at the redevelopment stage, fewer seriously divisive issues face the municipal politician and his constituents, and less time is spent discussing alternative approaches to the municipality's future.

Our examination of the job of the Metro council has shown that Metro affairs take up about one-third of the time of municipal politicians who serve on Metro. This figure is somewhat higher for mayors and for the controllers and executive aldermen who serve on Metro executive. Furthermore, we have found that Metro council and committee work absorbs less of a politician's time than his local council and committee obligations do. Although we do not suggest that Metro business is being neglected, these findings do raise questions about

the feasibility of having politicians responsible for both local and Metro affairs. In municipalities where the local workload is greatest, politicians who sit on Metro council are faced with difficult decisions about how to allocate their time. This is particularly a problem for the 24 Metro councillors who have executive responsibilities in their area municipalities.

It is understandable that local responsibilities are given more of the politician's time than Metro business, because the Metro councillors are all elected at the local level. Nonetheless, we must ask if having politicians serve the interests of both levels of municipal government is desirable, given the heavy local workload in some area municipalities, and the 'stacking' of local executive responsibilities and Metro obligations in so many cases. On the other hand, need for co-ordination between the two levels may make the present approach the best solution to the structural problems of Metropolitan Toronto.

Campaign costs vary widely among the area municipalities. Although differences in the size of the voting population may have some effect, we suggest that differences in campaign traditions are a more important factor. In some municipalities, campaigns seem to be conducted with less emphasis on such items as expensive election literature and advertising. To some extent, this may reflect differences in the intensity of political competition; in municipalities where there are basic philosophical conflicts and where the political stakes are higher, campaign costs tend to be higher as well. Municipality-wide elections are, in general, much more expensive than ward elections. Although this is in part a reflection of the differences in constituency size, there is also the possibility that candidates in at large elections use different and more expensive campaign techniques.

Campaign contributions are a more important factor in some municipalities than in others. There is some evidence that such contributions tend to counteract inter-municipal differences in the total cost of campaigns. In municipalities where election campaigns are most costly, successful candidates receive proportionately more of their expenses from outside contributions than in municipalities where campaign costs are low.

Among the politicians in our survey, the majority are from occupations where the possibilities of working part-time and of returning to full-time work are fairly good. The largest occupational groups are professionals and independent businessmen, who rate their occupations as being quite flexible. This lends support to the argument that future job considerations have an important effect on who is willing to run for public office. Slightly more than half the councillors who have private occupations have continued to work at them while they serve in public office. This pattern holds true in all the area municipalities except Toronto, where the council workload is heaviest. Those who combine public and private work tend to spend less time on their council duties than those whose council work is their sole occupation, but from our

examination of the issue, we cannot conclude that full-time politicians necessarily do a better job than those who continue to work at their private occupations. However, there is some evidence that those who continue with their private jobs foresee fewer employment problems than their colleagues when they leave public office.

The results of our study suggest that there are some basic political differences among the area municipalities. For instance, there is some evidence of greater political continuity in East York, Etobicoke and York than in the other municipalities. Politicians in these three boroughs have served in their present capacities longer than councillors in the other municipalities, and also have more experience, on average, when their service in all local public positions is examined. On the other hand, judging from the experience in office among incumbents, there seems to have been a recent change in political direction in North York and in Toronto.

From our examination of the time spent in council meetings, preparation for council, and committee work, we have proposed a continuum of conflict and consensus within area municipalities that has Toronto at one end, with the highest level of political conflict, and East York at the other with a fairly high level of consensus. In part, this is due to the nature of the issues being considered, for Toronto is confronting difficult choices about the kind of redevelopment that should take place, while East York has fewer of these divisive issues to resolve. Similar differences can be seen in the amount of time councillors devote to their constituents. In Scarborough and Toronto, constituency time is relatively high, partly because there are greater demands made of politicians by constituents who are affected by development and redevelopment proposals.

Figures on campaign financing also lend support to the idea that there are differences in political style. In East York, for instance, campaigns are inexpensive and campaign contributions are a relatively unimportant factor among successful candidates in our survey. The size of wards is roughly the same in Etobicoke and Toronto, but election campaigns are significantly less costly in Etobicoke, perhaps reflecting a different approach to campaigning. Campaign contributions are an important source of support for successful candidates in North York and Toronto, and this may reflect a greater propensity among politicians and voters there to regard political fund-raising as an accepted part of campaigning.

This study, and the survey on which it is based, were undertaken to provide information on an aspect of local government that has received relatively little attention: the job of the municipal politician.

The data we have collected are the politicians' own perceptions and recollections of their activity; while there are some difficulties involved in using such information as the basis for the study, the results include many valuable observations and recommendations from the councillors themselves.

The interpretations and suggestions we have offered are obviously tentative in many cases, but they may serve as fruitful areas of investigation when further research is being done. For the present, we hope this material will be of assistance both to the participants and to the observers of political life in Metropolitan Toronto.

Publications of
**THE ROYAL COMMISSION
ON METROPOLITAN TORONTO**

BACKGROUND REPORTS

- The Organization of Local Government in Metropolitan Toronto
- A Financial Profile of Metropolitan Toronto and its Constituent Municipalities, 1967 - 1973
- The Planning Process in Metropolitan Toronto
- The Electoral System for Metropolitan Toronto
- Demographic Trends in Metropolitan Toronto
- The Provision and Conservation of Housing in Metropolitan Toronto
- Transportation Organization in Metropolitan Toronto
- Physical Services, Environmental Protection and Energy Supply in Metropolitan Toronto
- Public Safety Services in Metropolitan Toronto
- Social Policy in Metropolitan Toronto

STAFF STUDIES

- Political Life in Metropolitan Toronto: A Survey of Municipal Councillors

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

- Update (December, 1975) - a newspaper-format summary of background reports and submissions to the Commission to July, 1975

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POLITICAL LIFE IN METROPOLITAN TORONTO:
RESULTS OF A SURVEY OF MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS

Notes for an Address by
Honourable John P. Robarts, C.C., Q.C.

To The
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BUREAU OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH

Four Seasons Sheraton Hotel
Toronto

April 23, 1976

Note: Copies of the report summarized herein are available
from the Commission Office.

POLITICAL LIFE IN METROPOLITAN TORONTO:

RESULTS OF A SURVEY OF MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS

It was with considerable pleasure that I accepted your invitation to speak at this annual meeting of the Bureau of Municipal Research. The Bureau has a long and honourable history of providing independent research and comment on municipal government in Canada, and I am certain that this role will continue and expand as local government becomes even more important to the lives of individual Canadians. I was happy to be able to assist the Bureau and the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto in sponsoring a conference on various aspects of my current task last May; I know the discussions and the papers resulting from that conference were of assistance to the Commission as well as to those who were preparing briefs and submissions to it.

It is a little unnerving to find myself in the company of Senator Goldenberg and the Honourable Margaret Scrivener at the head table today. Senator Goldenberg laid the basis for the changes which resulted in the Metro system we now know, so he knows my business as well as, or perhaps better than, I do. On the other hand, and barring the vicissitudes of political life at the provincial level, Margaret Scrivener will probably be part of the provincial government that will ultimately have to deal with my report and decide whether it is worth implementing, changing or ignoring. In any case, it is a pleasure to see both of them again and to have them join me in trying to entertain and, I hope, enlighten you here today.

Before turning to the main topic of my remarks, I would like to outline briefly where the Commission stands in its work at the moment. As you know, about a year ago we published a series of ten background reports on various aspects of the existing system. These were designed to provide basic information for us and for those who were preparing briefs to the Commission. Since then, we have held a total of 27 days of public hearings, receiving 227 written and oral briefs. Then in December, we published a newspaper that summarized the research reports and the comments made in the first set of hearings, copies of which are available here today. We plan a similar publication in the next few weeks dealing with the remainder of the hearings.

As part of this process, the staff of the Commission have been consolidating the suggestions contained in the briefs in a comprehensive information system which will assist us in remembering what everybody said about any particular subject in our terms of reference.

We are also engaged in some further studies which are quite different from the first phase of research. The current and final phase is designed to develop a deeper knowledge in areas of particular concern and to help us develop possible solutions. One of these projects was a survey of the political life of municipal councillors, the results of which are my main topic today.

Other major projects in this second phase include:

- A study of local decision-making and administration and provincial controls over Metro and the area municipalities;
- A study of the possibilities for greater integration of human services; and
- A study of the future of local public finance, including future local spending patterns and possible revenue sources.

It is my hope that these studies will be completed by early July. In the meantime, I intend to spend some time in the United Kingdom finding out about the experience with local government reform in that jurisdiction. As you may know, the new government of Greater London has been in existence for more than ten years. Also, the entire local government system for the area outside of London was revamped at a single stroke in 1974. In both cases, the structures established have similarities with the Metro system and I would like to find out a bit about how they are doing and what problems might be foreseen and avoided here. In the same spirit, I have been studying the new system in Winnipeg with great interest and plan to spend some time there as well.

Following this, I have set aside about six months to complete my analysis and write my report, which I hope will be ready late this year.

That, then, completes a brief rundown on where the Commission stands at this point in its work. Knowing this, you might well wonder what I would be in a position to say in my remarks here today. While it is true that I cannot discuss, at this stage, any of the conclusions the Commission may reach, this is a good opportunity to describe the results of one piece of research I have already mentioned - the study of political life in Metropolitan Toronto.

The impetus for this study came from a number of the briefs as well as from some of the consultants who prepared research reports for the Commission. These sources pointed to the changing role of municipal councillors which reflects the shift in local priorities from such almost mechanical concerns as roads, water and sewage treatment to more political questions such as planning, growth, and the provision of a wide and varied range of human services. This shift in priorities, and the growth of the citizen participation movement, were said to have resulted in enormous increases in the demands on the time and energy of local elected representatives.

A number of people making representations to the Commission said, therefore, that what might be called the working conditions of local politicians -- remuneration, office space, secretarial help, and rules regarding election expenses -- required review.

I was prepared to believe this to be so, but I was not certain that it was my job to look into these factors. Eventually, however,

I began to realize that a number of these concerns were central to a review such as mine, because the elected representatives are the key and the pivot on which the whole structure depends. If they are overworked and underpaid, how can the taxpayer expect them to perform effectively in making decisions that involve millions of dollars and thousands of lives? If they are wasting their time on administrative trivia either as individuals or as councils, should we not be examining the circumstances which lead them to do this? And if they are trying to act as political decision-makers and if the public expects them to play this role, should we not examine whether this is possible if the system is postulated on other assumptions about the role of the local elected representatives?

It was with the idea of examining these questions and the background and experience of the present elected councillors that the Commission staff undertook in December and January a survey of all local councillors in Metro based on a structured set of questions. These questions were presented to councillors in a series of personal interviews, each of which took an average of 1 1/2 hours. The interviews were confidential, although it was understood that the overall results would be published.

In all, 87 of the 94 municipal councillors were interviewed. One alderman was unavailable due to illness, and the remaining six were members of the Reform Caucus of the City of Toronto Council who refused to participate in the study. However, 87 out of 94 is an excellent and quite reliable sample for this type of study and I am grateful for the co-operation of councillors who took the time to be interviewed.

The results are of great interest. I can only highlight what we found out in the time at my disposal today. A much deeper and more detailed analysis will be made, but I think you will find some of the results very intriguing. We only realized after the survey was completed how precious the time of the councillors is, because it was revealed that the average councillor in Metropolitan Toronto spends 49.5 hours per week on his council job. Mayors have the longest work week (74.0 hours) followed by controllers and executive aldermen (64.5 hours) and aldermen (43.0 hours). The average length of work week for all councillors by municipality varied from a low of 40.3 hours per week in East York to a high of 62.9 hours per week in the City of Toronto.

In reporting these results to you, I am acutely aware of the hazards of survey research. Just to illustrate the point, let me tell you about the results of a survey published in a recent medical magazine. A questionnaire was sent out to clinics asking them to provide a breakdown of their staff by sex and level of education. One clinic replied that their staff were not so much broken down by sex and education as they were by alcohol and other problems.

As I said, however, I think our results are fairly accurate given the personal interview technique and the number of people interviewed, but I must stress that the answers we were given were based on the

perceptions of the councillors themselves and not on any independent measurement.

What these figures mean is that, on average, your local representatives put in a good deal more than the equivalent of a full-time work week dealing with their public responsibilities, even though many are paid less than \$10,000.00 per year and more than half of them combine serving on councils with a part-time or full-time occupation.

We also looked at the work-week put in by Metro councillors as opposed to strictly local councillors. We found that, on average, Metro councillors put in a 62.9 hour week, while local councillors alone work a 40.9 hour week. It must be remembered, however, that one of the features of the present system is that most Metro councillors have local executive responsibilities on boards of control or the City Executive Committee which might help to explain their higher workload. Nonetheless, there would appear to be some foundation to the claims made by a number of people in briefs that Metro councillors have so much on their plate that it is difficult to do an effective job of evaluating budgetary and other policy proposals at the Metro level.

The next set of questions we asked concerned how the councillors spent their time, and here there were also wide variations among the different municipalities and among different positions on these councils. For example, politicians in the City of Toronto spend 28.4 hours per month in council meetings, while East York councillors spend 9.9 hours per month in this way. Yet only 56% of Toronto councillors considered council meetings too long, while more than 80% of the councillors in Scarborough, Etobicoke and North York considered their meetings amounting to 17 to 19 hours per month to be too long.

When asked why they thought the meetings were too long, the largest number of all councillors surveyed said that the presence of the press at the meetings was the main factor, while others cited lack of preparation on the part of their colleagues.

This brings me to another question we asked: Preparation time for council meetings. We found that, on average, councillors spent 10.3 hours per month or about 5 hours per meeting preparing for local council. Metro councillors, on the other hand, spent an average of 7.9 hours per month or about 4 hours per meeting preparing for Metro council. Again, this tends to bear out the contention made in briefs that Metro council work may suffer in the busy schedule imposed by local politics in Metropolitan Toronto.

We also asked about committee work, and found that the number of standing committees a councillor typically sits on varies from about two in York to more than four in East York, with the total time demands ranging from 15.6 hours per month in York to 40 hours per month in the City of Toronto. In addition, there are the time demands of local boards, Metro committees and Metro boards, and we collected data on all of these.

Finally, in our assessment of workload we asked about the amount of time per week the councillors estimated they spent with constituents. This ranged from a high of 16.9 hours per week in Scarborough to 6.9 hours per week in East York. On average, mayors spent 12 hours per week with constituents, controllers 7 hours, executive aldermen 11.5 hours and aldermen 13.4 hours. These figures indicate that the main burden of dealing with the public rests with the local aldermen in Metro, although mayors have a surprisingly high level of involvement with constituents, probably as a result of their visibility as the head of the municipality. It is also worth noting that controllers spend less time with their constituents than do executive aldermen, reflecting the fact that the latter are required to win and maintain their positions in local wards.

One should not conclude from these figures that those who spend a lot of time with constituents are good guys and those who don't are bad guys. In fact, there is some evidence in our survey that short council meetings and a low amount of time spent with constituents in municipalities such as East York reflect the existence of an atmosphere of consensus as to what the appropriate solutions to problems might be. Whether such a consensus is a permanent part of political life in these areas or a passing phase is a matter for conjecture.

With that very sketchy outline of the total workload of councillors and how they spend their time, I would like to turn now to other aspects of our survey. One area of interest is the facilities available to local councillors for doing their work. We collected information about the office space, secretarial help and research assistance available to councillors.

It is worth noting that the great majority of local politicians had no research assistance and more than half of these said they didn't need such help. Most of those who said they could use such assistance said they would not need an assistant full-time.

We also asked about the private occupations of councillors and found that about half of the councillors in the various municipalities in Metro do not work at any occupation other than their council positions. These are, however, heavily concentrated in the City of Toronto, and the most common pattern in the boroughs is for aldermen to have some other private occupation with controllers and mayors more likely to be full-time. We have seen, however, that on average all councillors spend more than the equivalent of a full-time work week on their council responsibilities.

Professionals -- lawyers, accountants, teachers and similar occupations -- represent the largest single group on council in Metro. The next largest group are independent businessmen. The third largest group, with 15 members, are those with no fixed occupation as such, ie. retired and housewives.

A majority of respondents indicated that they thought it would be quite easy to return to their private occupations if they were to leave political life. Remember, however, that the occupations represented most frequently on the various councils are those which permit a certain amount of flexibility and mobility between them and other pursuits such as politics. It is certainly clear that the mix of occupations found on councils does not fully reflect the proportion of these occupations in the work force in general. One must conclude, therefore, that a number of people in a variety of occupational groups are dissuaded from seeking local office, because of the financial insecurity involved or because of other factors.

I would expect that this situation might be found at other levels of government in Canada as well. It would be wise to keep this factor in mind when we hear complaints about the steps that are proposed to improve the financial rewards of serving as an elected representative. If we expect our elected bodies to be fully representative of their communities, we must try to overcome - somewhat - the obstacles faced by many socio-economic groups in becoming involved in politics.

A related factor is the question of election expenses. Here we found considerable variation in campaign costs in various municipalities in Metro. The majority of local politicians spent less than \$5,000.00 in the 1974 campaign, although the expenditures of some were well over \$15,000.00. In fact, we know that a good many campaigns in the boroughs cost less than \$2,000.00. In the City of Toronto, however, the pattern was different, with 13 of the councillors surveyed spending more than \$5,000.00. It is not surprising, therefore, that the City of Toronto councillors had the highest average percentage of campaign expenses from outside sources - 64%, while the lowest average percentage from outside contributions was in York, with 29%. Campaigns for mayor were the highest in outside contributions - 68% on average, with controllers at 33% and aldermen at 36%.

This is a curious phenomenon, particularly for those who see politicians as getting some kind of a free ride at public expense. In fact, those in the lowest paid positions (aldermen) pay fully 64% of their own campaign costs on average. Indeed, some of the respondents viewed their salaries as a means of covering campaign expenses and considered themselves to be donating the actual time they spent on their council work once they were elected.

One subject on which there was widespread agreement among those surveyed was the term of office. Nearly all members of council in Metro believe there should be a three year term for municipal office. In discussions with the interviewers, they stressed that a longer term was necessary to permit better decision-making and a greater degree of involvement by politicians in important matters such as planning and capital budgeting. They also mentioned that the costs of elections for both the candidates and the municipalities which administer them would be reduced if there were a three year term.

Well, I have thrown a great many figures at you in a very short period of time. In conclusion, I would like to summarize some of the things I think this survey shows:

(1) Political life in Metropolitan Toronto is extremely demanding on the time of the politicians, particularly those with local executive responsibilities and/or Metro Council membership. Aside from wondering how effective they can be given the workload, one must also wonder about the effect of this workload on family life and personal health for these people.

(2) There seem to be two broad patterns of political life in Metro. On the one hand, there are the full-time councillors with executive responsibilities and membership on Metro Council, who spend most of their waking hours on politics. This category also seems to include nearly all of the aldermen in the City of Toronto. On the other hand, there are the local aldermen, mostly in the boroughs, who combine their council responsibilities with a private occupation and see this as giving them a degree of independence which helps them get the best value for the local taxpayers. The question that must be faced is whether a system can or should be designed to permit both approaches to exist, or whether some basic decision needs to be made about the most appropriate role and responsibilities of all local politicians.

(3) It appears that membership on Metro Council places a significant additional burden on the local councillor. Given the fact that all councillors except the Metro chairman must win election at the local level, it is not surprising that time for Metro council is simply the time that can be spared from local affairs. What must be questioned is whether this arrangement meets the need for full and accountable political control over the Metro administration.

(4) The traditions and circumstances of political life vary significantly from municipality to municipality in Metro. While to some extent this conclusion is based on impressions rather than facts, it seems clear that each municipality in Metro has a number of unique characteristics in the way its elected representatives are selected and in how they are expected to perform.

This point is worth keeping in mind when one considers the structural changes that might be made in the Metro system as a result of the report of my Commission: While structure is important to good government, it is individuals who are the key to whether the system works or fails. In making changes, one must strike a balance between progress and the variety of local traditions which are part of life in any modern metropolitan area.

As I hope has been demonstrated, the survey we completed resulted in a wealth of information about local political life. I do not know of any other similar study which has been carried out in such depth. While it will be invaluable to the Commission in its further work and in preparing a final report, it will also be useful to both elected representatives and staff at both municipal and provincial levels of government in their efforts to understand and improve the local political process. With this in mind, I have decided to publish this study in its entirety, and a limited number of copies are available here today.

In particular, I know that a number of you are elected representatives who made the study possible by undergoing interviews. I sincerely hope that you will find the study of interest. I commend it to you and offer it as a token of my appreciation for your assistance and participation in the study.

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